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ABSTRACT 
 
 
REPLENISHMENT AND TRANSPORTATION PRICING DECISIONS 
UNDER TWO INDEPENDENT CARRIERS WITH DIFFERENT MODES 
 
Safa Onur Bingöl 
M.S. in Industrial Engineering 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Ayşegül Toptal 
January, 2009 
 
 
Freight transportation constitutes a substantial cost component in global economics 
and consumes significant amounts of energy. With the increasing oil prices, scarcity of 
resources and environmental concerns, efficient operation of transportation activities has 
become even more important than it was in the past. These raising concerns necessitate the 
companies which utilize this activity to plan for transportation more carefully and 
conservatively, and the ones that support it to appraise its value more cautiously.  
 
In this thesis, we consider a setting consisting of a retailer, a truck-load carrier and a 
less-than-truck-load carrier. We model and solve the retailer’s integrated inventory and 
transportation problem under the presence of two modes of carriers. Characterising the 
solution for the retailer’s replenishment problem, we then analyze the transportation pricing 
decisions of the carriers. We show that substantial savings can be achieved by the retailer due 
to integrating inventory and transportation decisions. We also quantify the savings for the TL 
carrier and the LTL carrier through carefully determining their transportation price schedules.  
 
Keywords: Transportation pricing, Truckload carrier, Less-than-truckload carrier, 
Transportation and inventory 
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ÖZET 
 
BAĞIMSIZ İKİ FARKLI TAŞIMA ŞİRKETİ DURUMUNDA NAKLİYE 
HİZMETİNİN FİYATLANDIRILMASI VE İKMAL KARARLARI 
 
 
Safa Onur Bingöl 
Endüstri Mühendisliği Yüksek Lisans 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ayşegül Toptal 
Ocak, 2009 
 
 
Eşya taşımacılığı global ekonomide önemli bir maliyet unsurunu teşkil etmekte ve 
önemli miktarda enerji tüketmektedir. Artan petrol fiyatlarına, kaynakların kıtlığına ve 
çevresel kaygılara bağlı olarak, nakliye faaliyetlerinin etkin bir şekilde kullanılması geçmişe 
nazaran çok daha önemli hale gelmiştir. Artan bu kaygılar, nakliye hizmeti alan şirketlerin 
daha dikkatli ve korunumlu planlama yapmasını, ve bu hizmeti verenlerin de daha ihtiyatlı bir 
şekilde fiyatlarını belirlemesini gerekli kılmıştır. 
 
Bu tezde, bir perakendeci, bir kamyonyükü taşıyıcısı ve bir birimyük taşıyıcısını 
içeren bir ortam ele alınmıştır. Perakendecinin entegre envanter ve nakliye problemi iki 
taşıma şirketinin varlığı altında modellenmiş ve çözülmüştür. Perakendecinin ikmal 
probleminin çözümü karakterize ediltikten sonra taşıyıcıların nakliyet hizmetini fiyatlandırma 
kararları analiz edilmiştir. Envanter ve nakliye kararlarının birleştirilmesi sonucu 
perakendecinin önemli tasarruf elde edebileceğini görülmüştür. Ayrıca, dikkatli bir şekilde 
nakliye fiyat tarifesine karar verme yoluyla kamyonyükü taşıyıcısının ve birimyük 
taşıyıcısının muhtemel kazanımları sayısal olarak gösterilmiştir.  
 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Nakliye hizmetinin fiyatlandırılması, Kamyonyükü taşıyıcısı, Birimyük 
taşıyıcısı, Nakliye ve envanter 
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Chapter 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Freight transportation is a significant component of the global economy. United States 
(US) and European Union (EU) hold the first two places in the world for their freight 
transportation expenditures. Freight shipping costs have been over 10% of the US Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) in 2007 [23]. In EU countries, volume of the freight transportation 
per ton/km is expected to increase by 78% from 2000 to 2020, while the EU GDP is expected 
to grow by 60% in the same period [13]. In Turkey, as an EU candidate, freight transportation 
by road is expected to increase by 148% from 2004 to 2020 and its usage among all 
transportation paths (road, air, sea) is expected to increase from 81.2% in 2004 to 84.3% in 
2020 [16].  
 
In light of the above statistics, minimization of shipping costs presents an important 
opportunity for companies to improve their profits. This requires an effort for all parties 
involved in the supply chain ranging from retailers to distributors to transporter companies. 
Integration of inventory replenishment and transportation decisions, aggregation of different 
products across suppliers or buyers, efficient routing decisions are some important tools to 
decrease transportation costs. Minimization of freight costs for the parties who utilize this 
function is a highly explored topic in recent supply chain studies. However, there is limited 
research suggesting operating policies for companies that undertake this functionality. With 
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the increasing oil prices, uncertainty in the market and the raising competition among 
transporter companies, this topic has become well worth to study. The objectives of this thesis 
are to suggest methods for freight transporters to make their pricing decisions and to quantify 
the savings that can be achieved through these decisions.   
 
With the above objectives in mind, we consider a system that consists of a retailer, a 
truckload (TL) carrier and a less than truckload (LTL) carrier. The retailer purchases the 
services of these carriers for inbound transportation and makes his/her replenishment 
decisions considering the related transportation costs and capacities. The TL carrier charges a 
fixed cost per truck regardless of whether the truck is fully or partially loaded. The LTL 
carrier charges in proportion to the number of units shipped. By loading as many quantities as 
possible in a truck, the retailer may get advantage of economies of scale inherent in fixed cost 
of each truck. However, this can happen to the extent that increased quantities do not raise the 
inventory related costs. If the quantity to be shipped does not justify the fixed cost of an 
additional truck, then the retailer uses the LTL carrier.  
  
In the setting of the problem of interest, both the TL and the LTL carrier have their 
own costs. Besides the fixed costs associated with a transaction, the TL carrier incurs a cost 
for each truck utilized and the LTL carrier incurs a cost per unit shipped. The TL carrier and 
the LTL carrier announce their pricing schedules before the retailer decides on his/her 
replenishment decision.   
 
In this thesis, we first model and solve the retailer’s replenishment problem under the 
given pricing decisions of the TL and the LTL carrier. Due to the complex structure exhibited 
by the retailer’s expected profit function, this analysis follows by investigating the structural 
properties of the profit function, which then leads to a characterization of the optimal solution. 
As it will be discussed in Chapter 3, the model and its solution can be used not only for the 
specific setting in this thesis but it also applies to a more general class of problems. In the 
later parts of the thesis, we study the pricing problems of the TL carrier and the LTL carrier 
assuming that they have full information about the retailer or his/her ordering behaviour. 
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More specifically, we first study the problem of the TL carrier to determine the price he/she 
will charge for a single truck with the objective of maximizing his/her own profits given the 
LTL carrier’s pricing schedule. Secondly, for a similar objective for the LTL carrier, we study 
his/her problem to determine the price to be charged for the shipment of a single unit given 
the TL carrier’s pricing schedule. The analysis for the two transportation pricing problems 
follows based on two different characterizations of the retailer’s optimal response and 
structural properties of his/her objective function, which are discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
In addition to an analytical investigation of the retailer’s replenishment problem and 
the carriers’ pricing problems, we illusrate over numerical examples the savings that can be 
achieved by the retailer as a result of jointly optimizing replenishment and transportation 
costs. We show that substantial savings can be achieved by the retailer in this setting due to 
the integrated model. We also illusrate the opportunity of savings for the TL carrier and the 
LTL carrier  by carefully deciding on the value of their transportation services.  We show that 
the TL carrier and the LTL carrier may increase their expected profits by percentages 
amounting to 27% and 20%, respectively. Another contribution of this thesis is that, we show 
the savings that can be achieved if the TL carrier and the LTL carrier coordinate. This can 
specifically be applicable to a situation where the truckload and the less-than-truck load 
transporation services are provided by the same company. Finally, we numerically show the 
impact of coordination between the retailer and one of the carriers.  
  
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: In Section 2, a review of the 
related literature is provided. In Section 3, a detailed discussion of the problem definition and 
the mathematical models are presented. Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of the retailer’s 
replenishment problem. In Section 5, the pricing problems of the TL and the LTL carriers are 
analyzed. The results of a numerical study for the transportation pricing problems are reported 
in Section 6. Finally, the conclusions of this study are summarized in Section 7 in relation to 
the future research directions.  
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Chapter 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
Integration of transportation and inventory decisions has recently attracted significant 
attention from both the academia and the industry. It has been shown that significant savings 
can be achieved if the decisions associated with these supply chain functions are coordinated. 
The research in this thesis is closely related to the group of studies (Aucamp [2], Lee [11], 
Toptal [22]) which model transportation costs and constraints within the replenishment 
problem.  The underlying replenishment problem in the thesis is different from the ones in the 
existing research in the fact that, the setting of interest herein considers the existence of two 
modes of transportation. The closest to our setting is the one that is analyzed by Rieksts and 
Ventura [18], however, in their modeling, demand is deterministic and the planning horizon is 
infinite. Another matter that is of importance in this thesis is transportation pricing. To our 
best knowledge, there is no study in the literature on transportation pricing. 
 
Integrated inventory and transportation models will be reviewed in section 2.1. In 
addition to the concept of coordinating inventory and transportation decisions for a single 
echelon, this thesis puts forward the idea of coordinating these functions between different 
parties in the supply chain. Therefore, a closely related area of the literature is coordination, 
which will be reviewed in Section 2.2.   
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2.1 Transportation Issues 
 
Aucamp [2] extends the standard EOQ model to the case where freight costs are 
determined by the integer number of carloads required to fill the order. Proposed solution 
method to determine the optimal solution yields three candidate solutions and the best of three 
is found by picking the one with the least cost. Aucamp [2] finds out that the optimal solution 
is not far away from the standard EOQ. In fact, the optimal solution involves a shipment that 
either uses the same number of cars as EOQ, or one less car.  
 
Carter and Ferrin [6] focus on the importance of including transportation costs in the 
optimal inventory-lot sizing decisions. The authors advocate the buyer to manage the inbound 
transportation. They give some company examples from the practice to support their 
decisions. They conclude that substantial reductions in the freight rate can be obtained even 
with small increases in order quantity. Also, when shipment charges are constant for any 
order quantity that falls between a weight break quantity and the next discount minimum 
quantity suggests that order quantities (inventories) could be decreased without increasing 
transportation costs.   
 
Rieksts and Ventura [18] analyze theoretical inventory models with constant demand 
rate and two transportation modes. The transportation options are truckloads (TL) with fixed 
costs, less than truckloads (LTL) with a constant per unit, or using a combination of both 
modes simultaneously. They derive optimal algorithms for single stage models over both an 
infinite and a finite planning horizon. They find out that optimal order interval should be in 
the same range with the optimal order interval of classical EOQ model and optimal order 
interval can either be one of the breakpoints or one of the minimizers of the average total cost 
functions with transportation costs. Mendoza and Ventura [14] extend the work done by 
Rieksts and Ventura to the case where all units or incremental quantity discount structures 
exist. They derive the optimal algorithms for each quantity discount structure for single stage 
models over an infinite planning horizon. 
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Lee [11] proposes algorithms on the classical EOQ model with setup cost including a 
fixed cost and freight cost. There is a quantity discount in freight costs. Assumptions of the 
proposed model are the same as the EOQ model except for the setup structure. Lee [11] refers 
his proposed model as the general model. The author also talks about some special cases of 
the general model.  It is assumed that in special case called Special Model 1, basic charge paid 
for the first P units is greater than the incremental charge paid for each P more units. In 
special case called Special Model 2, basic charge is assumed to be equal to the incremental 
charge. In this study, the author proposes two algorithms to find the optimal order quantity. 
First algorithm can be used to solve the general model. Second algorithm, which is proposed 
for Model 2, is more efficient. It compares three possible candidates for the optimal solution 
and selects the one with the least cost depending on some conditions. 
 
The use of the actual transportation cost function, complete with ranges of over-
declared shipments, requires a modification to the standard procedures for determining the 
optimal purchase order quantity. Russell and Krajewski [19] present an analytical procedure 
for finding the order quantity that minimizes total purchase costs which reflect both 
transportation economies and quantity discounts. They find out that the optimal purchase 
order quantity will be one of the four following possibilities: (1) the valid economic order 
quantity (EOQ), (2) a purchase price breakpoint in excess of valid EOQ, (3) a transportation 
rate breakpoint in excess of valid EOQ, (4) a modified EOQ which provides an over-declared 
shipment in excess of valid EOQ. They also develop an algorithm which systematically 
explores these four possibilities. Abad [1] extend the work done by Russell and Krajewski 
[19] to the case where there is a temporary price reduction (TPR) offered by the supplier. 
Abad considers the buyer’s response to a TPR when the buyer is responsible for paying for 
freight. Abad models freight costs using the freight tariffs offered by public carriers in the 
practice. The author develops a search procedure for determining the optimal purchase lot size 
for the buyer in response to the TPR offered by the supplier.  
 
Tersine and Barman [20] develop and demonstrate optimal inventory/transport 
decision algorithms when there are both unit and freight discounts. All units quantity/all 
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weight freight, incremental quantity/incremental freight, all units quantity/incremental freight 
and incremental quantity/all-weight freight discount pairs are investigated. The authors also 
deal with single and no discount conditions in the paper. 
 
2.2 Coordination Issues  
 
Monahan [15] analyzes how a supplier can structure the terms of an optimal quantity 
discount schedule. Monahan [15] shows that supplier can increase his/her net profit by 
changing the ordering behavior of the buyer to increase his/her order size by a specific rate. It 
is shown that the optimal order increase rate is both dependent on the supplier’s order 
processing/manufacturing setup cost and the buyer’s fixed order processing cost. Lee and 
Rosenblatt [12] generalize Monahan’s model to relax the implicit assumption of a lot-for-lot 
policy adopted by the supplier and to incorporate constraints imposed on the amount of 
discount that can be offered. Lee and Rosenblatt [12] also find out that lot-for-lot policy is 
optimal when the setup costs and holding costs of both the supplier and buyer are equal. 
Goyal [9] criticizes Lee and Rosenblatt’s way to impose constraints on discount amount 
offered by the supplier. His assertion is that supplier may offer price discounts lower than the 
purchase price because high discounts on purchase prices may lead to greater economies of 
scale for the supplier [5, 9].  
 
Banerjee [4] improves Monahan’s quantity discount model by considering supplier as 
a manufacturer. This means that supplier will hold finished goods inventory until the order is 
shipped to the buyer. Banerjee shows that Monahan’s model tends to overestimate the value 
of optimal order increase rate if the supplier is a manufacturer and claims that supplier will 
offer quantity discounts to the buyer to order smaller quantities which is not seen in practice a 
lot [4, 5]. Joglekar [10] criticizes Monahan’s one-item, one-customer and one-supplier model 
and judges Monahan’s implicit assumptions as unreasonable. Joglekar [10] shows that it is not 
economically beneficial for the supplier to match his/her production frequency with buyer’s 
ordering frequency if the supplier’s manufacturing setup costs are substantially larger than 
buyer’s ordering costs. If these are of similar magnitude, Monahan’s model does not have 
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much practical significance even though Monahan’s assumptions hold. Supplier can increase 
his/her profit more by considering a better production lot size policy instead of considering 
quantity discounts.  
 
Weng and Wong [24] develop general models for the supplier’s all-unit quantity 
discount policy. The models developed deal with four major issues: (a) one buyer or multiple 
buyers, (b) constant or price elastic demand, (c) the relationship between supplier’s ordering 
or production policy and the buyer’s ordering size, (d) supplier is either a manufacturer or a 
wholesaler. Objectives of these models are either the supplier’s profit improvement or the 
supplier’s increased profit share analysis. They also develop algorithms to find the optimal 
decision policies. This paper provides the supplier with both the optimal all-unit quantity 
discount policy and the optimal production (or ordering) policy. 
 
Goyal [8] models the replenishment problems of the single buyer/ single vendor 
systems using independent (decentralized) and integrated (centralized) approaches under the 
following assumptions: Buyer demand is deterministic and constant, no stockouts are 
permitted, vendor is not a manufacturer, buyer and vendor replenishment lead times are zero 
and minimization of the variable cost is the criterion of optimality. Goyal [8] finds out that 
total cost of centralized policy can not be greater or equal to the total cost of decentralized 
policy. Another important result in the paper is that, in centralized policy, buyer will order 
less frequently but in larger sizes. Using these results, the author concludes that vendor and 
buyer can make some agreements to get the advantage of the centralized solution. Banerjee 
[3] also focuses on the replenishment decisions in a single-vendor, single-buyer and single-
product environment under the following assumptions; vendor is a manufacturer, there is a 
replenishment lead time, cycle times of the vendor and the buyer are same, order quantity of 
vendor is an integer multiple of the order quantity of the buyer . This paper develops a joint 
economic lot size model for a special case where vendor produces to order for a purchaser on 
a lot-for-lot basis under deterministic conditions. It is shown that a jointly optimal ordering 
policy, together with an appropriate price adjustment, can be beneficial for both parties or, at 
least does not place either at a disadvantage.  
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Pasternack [17] considers the pricing decision faced by a producer of a commodity 
with a short shelf or demand life in a newsboy setting under the following assumptions; 
retailer will place only one order with the manufacturer, retailer will sell the product until 
his/her inventory is depleted, or the shelf life is exhausted. Manufacturer’s selection of the 
amount per unit charged to the retailer, the per unit credit for returned goods, and the 
percentage of purchased goods allowed to be returned are critical in achieving channel 
coordination and maximizing total profits. Pasternack [17] shows that the policy of a 
manufacturer allowing unlimited returns  for full credit and the policy of a manufacturer 
allowing no returns are system suboptimal. On the other hand, a policy for unlimited returns 
at partial credit will be system optimal for appropriately chosen cost values. This policy can 
also achieve channel coordination in a multi-retailer environment. 
 
Toptal and Çetinkaya [21] consider the coordination problem between a vendor and a 
buyer operating under generalized replenishment costs that include fixed costs as well as 
stepwise freight costs. They study the stochastic demand, single period setting where the 
buyer must decide on the order quantity to satisfy the random demand for a single item with a 
short product life cycle. They develop two models and derive the optimal order quantities 
both under decentralized and centralized settings. In the first model, they incorporate truck 
costs for the vendor only. In the second model, they incorporate truck costs both for the buyer 
and the vendor. Unlike the earlier research in this area, they prove that the vendor’s expected 
profit is not increasing in buyer’s order quantity. Their analysis show that the vendor can 
improve his/her profits by using an appropriate tariff schedule or a vendor managed delivery 
contract (VMD). Under VMD contract, vendor covers the buyer’s transportation expenses. 
They show that a VMD arrangement potentially improves the centralized solution. Toptal [22] 
extend the work done by Toptal and Çetinkaya [21] by analyzing a single echelon 
replenishment problem under a general replenishment cost structure that includes stepwise 
freight costs and all-units quantity discounts. The author proves several useful properties of 
the expected profit function and utilizes these properties to develop a computational solution 
approach to find the optimal order quantity. The solution procedures developed in this paper 
can easily be applied to multi-echelon settings. 
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Ertogral et al. [7] analyze the single vendor-single buyer problem under equal-size 
shipment policy. Two new models that integrate the transportation cost explicitly are 
developed. The transportation cost is considered to be in an all-unit-discount format for the 
first model. The option of over declaring a shipment to exploit the transportation cost 
structure is explored in the second model. Two important conclusions can be derived from 
this paper. First, savings can be realized by explicitly integrating transportation cost into the 
supply chain under consideration, depending on the transportation contribution to the total 
cost. Second, production and inventory decisions are affected when transportation is 
considered explicitly in the model. Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 classify the papers reviewed in this 
thesis. 
 
Table 2.1 Paper classifications according to the number of echelons, problem’s time horizon, 
location and structure of the transportation cost  
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Table 2.2 Paper classifications according to the demand, wholesale price and unit cost structures 
 
 
Table 2.3 Paper classifications according to the type of the vendor and decision variables 
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Chapter 3 
 
PROBLEM DEFINITION  
 
 
In this study, we consider a system that includes a retailer and two carriers. The retailer 
operates in a Newsboy setting. That is, he/she makes a single replenishment decision at the 
beginning of a period during which he/she faces random demand. If the order quantity Q is 
greater than the demand, then excess items are salvaged at a $ v unit revenue. If it is less than 
the demand, then the retailer incurs a unit lost sale cost of $b. The retailer pays for the 
transportation of incoming materials. There are two modes of transportation, a TL carrier and 
a LTL carrier. The TL carrier charges $R per each truck whether it is fully or partially loaded. 
Each truck has a capacity of carrying P units and the TL carrier has ample number of trucks 
available. The LTL carrier charges $s per unit where .R s RP < <  That is, for carrying a truck 
load of items, using the TL carrier is always less costly than using a LTL carrier. However, 
utilizing a truck has more costs when the quantity to be carried is less than .R s  More 
explicitly, the transportation cost of the retailer for replenishing Q units is given by  
 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }min , 1C Q s Q iP iR i R= − + +  or  
 
( ) min , ,Q QC Q R R s Q P
P P
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= +  −⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
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where ( )1iP Q i P≤ < +  such that { }0 .i +∈ ∪Z  Here, +Z  is the set of all positive integers. 
The above expression can be rewritten either as 
 
  ( )s Q iP iR− +   if  RiP Q iPs≤ < +  
   ( )C Q =                       ( )1
  ( )1i R+   if  ( )1 ,R iP Q i Ps + ≤ < +  
 
or as 
 
  Q Qs Q P RP P
⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥− +⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠   if  
Q QRP Q PP s P
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥≤ < +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
   ( )C Q =                       
  Q RP
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥      if  ,
Q QR P Q Ps P P
⎢ ⎥ ⎡ ⎤+ ≤ <⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥  
 
For given values of R, P and s, retailer’s expected profit for replenishing Q units, i.e. 
( ) ,H Q  is given by ( ) ( )G Q C Q−  where 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
Q
G Q r v c v Q r b v Q x f x dx
∞= − μ − − + + − −∫               ( )2
   
The TL carrier and the LTL carrier incur fixed setup costs as long as the retailer 
utilizes their services. Once the retailer decides on his/her replenishment quantity and how 
much of it will be carried by which carrier, the carriers are in charge of performing the 
required service. Namely, for long term business and customer satisfaction, neither the TL 
carrier nor the LTL carrier rejects an order even if the revenue does not cover the fixed costs 
implying that it is not a profitable transaction.  
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Before introducing TL carrier’s and LTL carrier’s expected profit functions, we next 
summarize the notation introduced so far and that will be used in the remaining parts of the 
text. 
 
      :r   Retail price per unit. 
      :b    Retailer’s per unit lost sale cost.  
      :v    Salvage value of an item unsold at the retailer. 
      :c    Wholesale price per unit. 
     :R    Per truck shipping price that the TL carrier charges. 
     :R    The TL carrier’s fixed cost for utilizing one truck. 
     :P   Capacity of a truck in number of units. 
      :s    Per unit shipping price that the LTL carrier charges. 
     :s    The LTL carrier’s cost for shipping one unit. 
 :TLK   Setup cost of the TL carrier. 
          :LTLK   Setup cost of the LTL carrier. 
     :Q   Retailer’s replenishment quantity. 
           ( )C Q :  Transportation cost of the retailer for replenishing Q units. 
           ( ) :G Q   Retailer’s expected profit function excluding the truck costs. 
          ( ) :H Q   Retailer’s expected profit function. 
    1 :Q   Quantity transported using the TL carrier. 
                2 :Q   Quantity transported using the LTL carrier. 
  ( ), :TL Q R∏   TL carrier’s profit if the retailer replenishes Q units. 
( ), :LTL Q s∏   LTL carrier’s profit if the retailer replenishes Q units. 
      X :    Random variable showing demand in a single period. 
            ( ) :f x   Probability density function of demand. 
                  :μ   Expected value of demand. 
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The TL carrier’s profits ( )TL Q∏  in this system are given by 
 
       ( ) TLi R R K× − −    if  RiP Q iPs≤ < +  and 0Q >  
( ),TL Q R∏ =        ( ) ( )1 TLi R R K+ × − −  if  ( )1 ,R iP Q i Ps + ≤ < +               ( )3
         0     otherwise, 
 
which can alternatively be written as 
 
      ( ) TLQ R R KP⎢ ⎥ × − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦     if  Q QRP Q PP s P⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥≤ < +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  and 0Q >  
( ),TL Q R∏ =        ( ) TLQ R R KP⎡ ⎤× − −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥   if  ,Q QR P Q Ps P P⎢ ⎥ ⎡ ⎤+ ≤ <⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥               
         0      otherwise. 
 
 Similarly, the LTL carrier’s profits ( )LTL Q∏  are   
         
   ( ) ( ) LTLs s Q iP K− × − −   if  RiP Q iPs< < +             
       ( ),LTL Q s∏ =           ( )4  
       0      otherwise, 
 
 
which can alternatively be represented as 
 
   ( ) LTLQs s Q P KP⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥− × − −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠   if  Q QRP Q PP s P⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥< < +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦             
       ( ),LTL Q s∏ =            
       0       otherwise. 
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Expression ( )1  implies that, if ,RiP Q iPs≤ < +  then 1Q iP=  and 2 .Q Q iP= −  Similarly, if 
( )1 ,R iP Q i Ps + ≤ < +  then 1 ( 1)Q i P= +  and 2 0.Q =  Note also that, TL carrier does not get 
any profit from this transaction if ( )1 TL
K
R RP
Q ≤ −
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥  and the LTL carrier does not get any profit 
from this transaction if ( )2 .LTL
K
s s
Q −≤  
 
In order to write a more explicit expression for the retailer’s expected profit function, 
we introduce the following two functions over 0Q ≥  and { }0 :j +∈ ∪Z  
 
( ) ( ) ( )1 ,H Q j G Q s Q jP jR= − − −                   ( )5  
and 
 ( ) ( )2 , .H Q j G Q jR= −                    ( )6  
 
It turns out that we have 
 
  ( )1 ,H Q i   if  iP Q iPRs≤ < +  
  ( )H Q =                      ( )7  
  ( )2 , 1H Q i +   if  ( )1 .iP Q i PRs + ≤ < +  
 
 
Given the values of R and s, the retailer solves the following problem to decide on his/her 
replenishment quantity. 
 
max
Q
 ( )H Q  
 
 s.t. 0.Q ≥   
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Let the optimal solution of the above problem be ( )* , .Q R s  In this thesis, we first 
analyze the structural properties of ( )H Q  and propose a finite time exact solution procedure 
for finding ( )* ,Q R s  given the values of R and s.  Then we study the underlying 
transportation pricing problems that the TL and LTL carriers face. Namely, given the TL 
carrier’s per truck shipping price R, we study the problem of the LTL carrier in deciding the 
value of s. We refer to this problem as LTLP. Then given the LTL carrier’s per unit 
transportation charge, we study the problem of TL carrier in deciding the value of R, referred 
to as Problem TLP. Throughout this analysis, we assume that the two carriers know the 
retailer’s inventory related costs and hence they predict the response of the retailer in terms of 
his/her order quantity, i.e., the value of ( )* , .Q R s  
 
The pricing problems of the TL carrier as described above can be formulized as 
follows: 
 
TLP: 
max
R
 ( )( )* , ,TL Q R s R∏  
 
 s.t. ,sPR <   
            .sR >       
 
Similarly, the pricing problem of the LTL carrier is given by 
 
LTLP: 
max
s
 ( )( )* , ,LTL Q R s s∏  
 
 s.t. .R s RP < <  
 
In the next section, we study the retailer’s replenishment problem to characterize his/her 
response to given values of R and s. 
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Chapter 4 
 
RETAILER’S INTEGRATED INVENTORY 
REPLENISHMENT AND 
TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM 
 
 
 
In this section, we propose an algorithm to find the maximizer of ( ).H Q  As seen in Figure 
4.1,  ( )H Q  is a piecewise function. Therefore, our analysis will follow by proving some of 
its structural properties. Regarding Expression ( )2 , we would like to note that the analysis in 
this chapter will use the fact that )(QG  is a strictly concave function of Q   
2
2i.e.,
( ) 0d G Q
dQ
⎛ ⎞  ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠<
. Therefore, the analysis herein is not restricted to the Newsboy setting but 
it also applies to a more general class of problems where the production/inventory related 
expected profits of the retailer is strictly concave. The following lemma indicates the 
continuity of ( )H Q  which forms the fundamental component of our analysis for finding the 
optimal solution of the replenishment problem. 
 
 
Lemma 1 ( )H Q  is a continuous function of Q. 
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Proof: Since ( )1 ,H Q j  and ( )2 ,H Q j  are continuous functions of Q for fixed j, we will prove 
that ( )H Q  is continuous at the breakpoints which are iP and ,R iPs +  { }0 .i +∈ ∪Z  Let us 
first consider ,RQ iPs= +  { }0 .i +∈ ∪Z  Note that, we have  
 
lim
RQ iP
s
⎛ ⎞→ +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
− ( ) 1 , .
RH Q H iP i
s
⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
 
Using Expression ( )5 ,  it follows that  
 
 
lim
RQ iP
s
⎛ ⎞→ +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
− ( ) ( ) ,
R RH Q G iP s iP sP R i
s s
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + − + + −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠  
 
which leads to 
 
lim
RQ iP
s
⎛ ⎞→ +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
− ( ) ( )1 .
RH Q G iP R i
s
⎛ ⎞= + − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
 
Expression ( )6  implies that the right hand side of above equality is ( )2 , 1RH iP is +  +  which 
is equal to ( ).RH iPs +  
 
Next, we will show that ( )H Q is continuous at ,Q iP=  .i +∈Z  As Q approaches to iP from 
the below, the one sided limit of ( )H Q is given by, 
 
( )
lim
Q iP→ −
( ) ( )2 , .H Q H iP i=  
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Using Expression ( )6 ,  we have  
 
( )
lim
Q iP→ −
( ) ( ) .H Q G iP iR= −  
 
Rewriting the right-hand side of the above equality as ( ) ( ),G iP siP i sP R− + −  it can be 
observed from Expression ( )5  that 
( )
lim
Q iP→ −
( ) ( ) ( )1 , .H Q H iP i H iP= =      ■ 
 
2480
2530
2580
2630
2680
2730
650 662 674 686 698 710 722 734 746 758 770 782 794 806 818 830 842 854
 
Figure 4.1 An illustration of the retailer’s expected profit function 
 
Since ( )G Q  is a strictly concave function, it follows from Expressions ( )5  and ( )6  that 
( )1 ,H Q j  and ( )2 ,H Q j  are strictly concave functions over Q for fixed j. Therefore, they 
have unique maximizers. Let q* be the maximizer of ( ).G Q  It can be observed that q* is also 
the unique maximizer of ( )2 , ,H Q j  .j∀  Similarly, let z* be the unique maximizer of 
H(Q) 
Q
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( )1 , ,H Q j .j∀  It follows from Expression ( )5  that ( )* .G z s′ =  The following lemma 
characterizes the ordinal relationship between q* and z*. 
 
Lemma 2 We have * *.z q<  
 
Proof: Since q* is the unique maximizer of ( ) ,G Q  which is a strictly concave function of Q, 
we have ( ) 0G Q′ >  Q∀  s.t. *Q q<  and ( ) 0G Q′ <  Q∀  s.t. *.Q q>  By definition of z*, we 
have ( )* .G z s′ =  Since 0,s >  it follows that * *.z q<                                                             ■ 
 
In the following analysis, we will prove some structural properties of ( )H Q  to arrive 
at an algorithm that finds ( )* , .Q R s  In this analysis, we say z* is realizable if there exists 
{ }0i +∈ ∪Z  such that .RiP Q iPs≤ < +  Similarly, q* is realizable if there exists { }0i +∈ ∪Z  
such that ( )1 .R iP Q i Ps + ≤ < +  In the next lemma, we show that z* dominates all order 
quantities that are smaller than itself, therefore, in maximizing ( ) ,H Q  order quantities less 
than z* should not be considered.  
 
Lemma 3 We have ( ) ( )* ,H Q H z<  *.Q z∀ <  
 
Proof: The proof will follow by considering the following two cases: 
 
i) ( ) ( )1* *,H z H z i=  where * RiP z iPs≤ < +  for some { }0 .i +∈ ∪Z  That is, z* is realizable. 
 
ii) ( ) ( )2* *, 1H z H z i= +  where ( )* 1R iP z i Ps + ≤ < +  for some { }0 .i +∈ ∪Z  That is, z* is 
not realizable. 
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Case 1, z* is realizable: First, we will show that ( ) ( )* ,H z H Q>  Q∀  s.t. * RjP z jPs≤ < +  
and .j i≤  To complete the proof for Case 1, secondly, we will show that ( ) ( )* ,H z H Q>  
Q∀  s.t. ( )* 1R jP z j Ps + ≤ < +  and .j i<  
 
Let us start with Q such that RjP Q jPs≤ < +  and .j i≤  Since z* is the unique 
maximizer of ( )1 ,H Q j  over Q, ,j∀  we have 
 
( ) ( )1 1*, , ,H z j H Q j>   ,RjP Q jPs≤ < +   .j i≤                                       ( )8
            
Using Expression ( )5 , we further have 
 
( ) ( )1 1*, *, , .H z i H z j j i> ∀ <                                                                            ( )9
                   
It follows from Expressions ( )8  and ( )9  that 
 
( ) ( )1 1*, , ,H z i H Q j>    ,RjP Q jPs≤ < +   .j i≤   
 
Recall from Expression ( )7  that we have ( ) ( )1 ,H Q H Q j=  for Q such that .RjP Q jPs≤ < +  
Therefore, the above expression implies 
 
( ) ( )* ,H Q H z<   Q∀  s.t. RjP Q jP
s
≤ < +  and .j i≤                                          ( )10
               
Now, let us consider Q such that ( )1R jP Q j Ps + ≤ < +  and .j i<  Recall that 
( )2 ,H Q j  is a strictly concave function of Q for fixed ,j  and q* is its unique maximizer. 
Since * * ,q z iP> ≥  it follows that  
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( ) ( )2 2, , ,H Q j H jP j<   Q jP∀ <  and .j i≤                                     ( )11
       
Note also that we have ( ) ( )1 2, , .H jP j H jP j=  Combining this with the fact that 
*z iP jP≥ ≥  further leads to 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2*, , , ,H z j H jP j H jP j≥ =  .j i∀ ≤                                                    ( )12
                        
Using Expressions ( )11  and ( )12 , we conclude that 
 
( ) ( )1 2*, , ,H z j H Q j>   Q jP∀ <  and .j i≤  
 
The above expression implies that  
 
( ) ( )1 2*, , ,H z j H Q j>   Q∀  s.t. ( )1R j P Q jPs + − ≤ <  and 1 ,j i≤ ≤  
 
which can be rewritten as  
 
( ) ( )1 2*, , ,H z j H Q j>   Q∀  s.t. ( )1R jP Q j Ps + ≤ < +  and 0 .j i≤ <  
 
Recall from Expression ( )7  that, we have ( ) ( )2 ,H Q H Q j=  for Q such that 
( )1 .R jP Q j Ps + ≤ < +  Therefore,  
 
( ) ( )* ,H z H Q>     Q∀  s.t. ( )1R jP Q j P
s
+ ≤ < +  and 0 .j i≤ <  
 
Combining Expression ( )10  with the above result, we conclude that ( ) ( )* ,H z H Q>  
*Q z∀ <  if { }0i +∃ ∈ ∪Z  such that .RiP Q iPs≤ < +  
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Case 2, z* is not realizable: The proof of this case is similar to that of Case 1. We will first 
show that ( ) ( )* ,H z H Q>  Q∀  s.t. RjP Q jPs≤ < +  and .j i≤  To complete the proof for 
Case 2, secondly, we will show that ( ) ( )* ,H z H Q>  Q∀  s.t. ( )1R jP Q j Ps + ≤ < +  and 
*.Q z<  
 
Let us start with Q such that RjP Q jPs≤ < +  and .j i≤  The fact that 
( ) ( )2* *, 1H z H z i= +  implies 
 
( ) ( )2 1*, 1 *, .H z i H z i+ ≥  
 
Since ( ) ( )1 1*, *, ,H z i H z j>  ,j i∀ <  and z* is the unique maximizer of ( )1 ,H Q j  over Q, we 
have 
 
( ) ( )1 1*, , ,H z i H Q j>   Q∀  s.t. RjP Q jPs≤ < +  and .j i≤  
 
Therefore,  
 
( ) ( )2 1*, 1 , ,H z i H Q j+ >  Q∀  s.t. RjP Q jPs≤ < +  and ,j i≤             ( )13
            
and hence, 
 
( ) ( )* ,H z H Q>   Q∀  s.t. RjP Q jP
s
≤ < +  and .j i≤                         ( )14
          
Now, let us consider Q such that ( )1R jP Q j Ps + ≤ < +  and *.Q z<  Since q* is the 
unique maximizer of ( )2 ,H Q j  over Q and * *,z q<  it follows that 
( ) ( )2 2*, 1 , 1 ,H z i H Q i+ > +  and hence,  
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( ) ( )* ,H z H Q>  Q∀  s.t. *.R iP Q z
s
+ ≤ <                           ( )15  
 
We have * * ,q z iP> >  therefore, 
 
( ) ( )2 2, , ,H Q j H jP j<   ,Q jP∀ <  1 .j i≤ ≤                ( )16  
 
Expression ( )13  implies that 
 
( ) ( )2 1*, 1 , ,H z i H jP j+ >  .j i∀ ≤                  ( )17  
 
Using the fact that ( ) ( )1 2, , ,H jP j H jP j=  Expressions ( )16  and ( )17  lead to  
 
( ) ( )2 2*, 1 , ,H z i H Q j+ >  Q∀  such that ( )1R jP Q j Ps + ≤ < +  and ,j i<  
 
and hence, 
 
( ) ( )* ,H z H Q>  Q∀  such that ( )1R jP Q j P
s
+ ≤ < +  and .j i<                       ( )18  
 
Combining Expressions ( )15  and ( )18 ,  we have 
 
( ) ( )* ,H z H Q>  Q∀  such that ( )1R jP Q j P
s
+ ≤ < +  and *.Q z<            ( )19     
               ■ 
 
In the next lemma, we show that q* dominates all order quantities that are greater than itself, 
therefore, in maximizing ( ) ,H Q  order quantities greater than q* should not be considered. 
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Lemma 4 We have ( ) ( )* ,H Q H q<  *.Q q∀ >  
 
Proof: The proof will follow by considering the following two cases: 
 
i) ( ) ( )2* *, 1H q H q i= +  where ( )* 1R iP q i Ps + ≤ < +  for some { }0 .i +∈ ∪Z  That is, q* is 
realizable. 
 
ii) ( ) ( )1* *,H q H q i=  where * RiP q iPs≤ < +  for some { }0 .i +∈ ∪Z  That is, q* is not 
realizable. 
 
Case 1, q* is realizable: First, we will show that ( ) ( )* ,H q H Q>  Q∀  s.t. 
( )1 ,R jP Q j Ps + ≤ < +  j i≥  and *.Q q>  Secondly, we will show that ( ) ( )* ,H q H Q>  
Q∀  s.t. ,RjP Q jPs≤ < +  ,j i>  and this will complete the proof for Case 1. 
 
Let us start with Q such that ( )1 ,R jP Q j Ps + ≤ < +  j i≥  and *.Q q>  Since q* is the 
unique maximizer of ( )2 ,H Q j  over Q, ,j∀  we have 
 
( ) ( )2 2*, 1 , 1 ,H q j H Q j+ > +     ( )1 ,R jP Q j Ps + ≤ < +   j i≥  and *.Q q>          ( )20
                                                       
Using Expression ( )6 , we further have 
 
( ) ( )2 2*, 1 *, 1 , .H q i H q j j i+ > + ∀ >                  ( )21                    
                   
It follows from Expressions ( )20  and ( )21  that 
 
( ) ( )2 2*, 1 , 1 ,H q i H Q j+ > +    ( )1 ,R jP Q j Ps + ≤ < +   j i≥  and *.Q q>   
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Recall from Expression ( )7  that we have ( ) ( )2 , 1H Q H Q j= +  for Q such that 
( )1 .R jP Q j Ps + ≤ < +  Therefore, the above expression implies 
 
( ) ( )* ,H Q H q<    Q∀  s.t. ( )1 ,R jP Q j P
s
+ ≤ < +  j i≥  and *.Q q>    ( )22                   
               
Now, let us consider Q such that RjP Q jPs≤ < +  and .j i>  Recall that ( )1 ,H Q j  is a 
strictly concave function of Q for fixed ,j  and z* is its unique maximizer. Since 
( )1 * *,i P q z+ > >  it follows that  
 
( ) ( )1 1, , ,H Q j H jP j<    Q jP∀ >  and .j i>                         ( )23
                                                               
Note also that we have ( ) ( )1 2, , .H jP j H jP j=  Combining this with the fact that 
( )1 *jP i P q≥ + >  further leads to 
 
( ) ( ) ( )2 2 1*, , , ,H q j H jP j H jP j> =  .j i∀ >                                     ( )24    
                                                                       
Using Expressions ( )23  and ( )24 , we conclude that 
 
( ) ( )2 1*, , ,H q j H Q j>     Q jP∀ ≥  and .j i>  
 
The above expression implies that  
 
( ) ( )2 1*, , ,H q j H Q j>     Q∀  s.t. RjP Q jPs≤ < +  and .j i>  
 
Recall from Expression ( )7  that, we have ( ) ( )1 ,H Q H Q j=  for Q such that 
.RjP Q jPs≤ < +  Therefore,  
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( ) ( )* ,H q H Q>     Q∀  s.t. RjP Q jP
s
≤ < +  and .j i>  
 
Combining Expression ( )22  with the above result, we conclude that ( ) ( )* ,H q H Q>  
*Q q∀ >  if { }0i +∃ ∈ ∪Z  such that ( )* 1 .R iP q i Ps + ≤ < +  
 
Case 2, q* is not realizable: The proof of this case is similar to that of Case 1. We will first 
show that ( ) ( )* ,H q H Q>  Q∀  s.t. ( )1R jP Q j Ps + ≤ < +  and .j i≥  To complete the proof 
for Case 2, secondly, we will show that ( ) ( )* ,H q H Q>  Q∀  s.t. ,RjP Q jPs≤ < +  j i≥  
and *.Q q>  
 
Let us start with Q such that ( )1R jP Q j Ps + ≤ < +  and .j i≥  The fact that 
( ) ( )1* *,H q H q i=  implies 
 
( ) ( )1 2*, *, 1 .H q i H q i> +  
 
Since ( ) ( )2 2*, 1 *, 1 ,H q i H q j+ > +  ,j i∀ >  and q* is the unique maximizer of ( )2 ,H Q j  over 
Q, we have 
 
( ) ( )2 2*, 1 , 1 ,H q i H Q j+ > +   Q∀  s.t. ( )1R jP Q j Ps + ≤ < +  and .j i≥  
 
Therefore,  
 
( ) ( )1 2*, , 1 ,H q i H Q j> +  Q∀  s.t. ( )1R jP Q j Ps + ≤ < +  and ,j i≥                      ( )25
                                                              
and hence, 
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( ) ( )* ,H q H Q>  Q∀  s.t. ( )1R jP Q j P
s
+ ≤ < +  and .j i≥                                    ( )26
                             
Now, let us consider Q such that RjP Q jPs≤ < +  and *.Q q>  Since z* is the unique 
maximizer of ( )1 ,H Q j  over Q and * *,z q<  it follows that ( ) ( )1 1*, , ,H q i H Q i>  *,Q q∀ >  
and hence,  
( ) ( )* ,H q H Q>   Q∀  s.t. * .Rq Q iP
s
< < +               ( )27
                                                                                                             
We have ( )1 * *,i P q z+ > >  therefore, 
 
( ) ( )1 1, , ,H Q j H jP j<   ,Q jP∀ >  .j i>                                       ( )28
                                                                                    
Expression ( )25  implies that 
 
( ) ( )1 2*, , ,H q i H jP j>  .j i∀ >                 ( )29  
 
Using the fact that ( ) ( )1 2, , ,H jP j H jP j=  Expressions ( )28  and ( )29  lead to  
 
( ) ( )1 1*, , ,H q i H Q j>  Q∀  such that RjP Q jPs≤ < +  and ,j i>  
 
and hence, 
 
( ) ( )* ,H q H Q>  Q∀  such that RjP Q jP
s
≤ < +  and .j i>                       ( )30  
 
Combining Expressions ( )27  and ( )30 ,  we have 
 
( ) ( )* ,H q H Q>  Q∀  such that RjP Q jP
s
≤ < +  and *.Q q>                    ( )31  
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               ■ 
 
Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 jointly imply that we should only focus on Q such that * *z Q q≤ ≤  
while optimizing ( ).H Q  In Lemma 5 and Lemma 6, by a similar analysis,  we further 
eliminate some quantity values between z* and q*. 
 
Lemma 5 Let Q be an order quantity such that * *z Q q< <  and ,RjP Q jPs≤ < +  
{ }0 .j +∈ ∪Z  Then, we have ( )max *, .QH z P H QP⎛ ⎞⎧ ⎫⎢ ⎥ >⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭⎝ ⎠  
 
Proof: Note that, if max *, *,Qz P zP
⎧ ⎫⎢ ⎥ =⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭  then  .jPs
RQ* zjP +<<<   In this case, we 
have ( ) ( )1* *,H z H z j=  and ( ) ( )1 , .H Q H Q j=  Since z* is the maximizer of ( )1 ,H Q j  over 
Q, it follows that ( ) ( )1 1*, , ,H z j H Q j>  and hence, ( ) ( )* .H z H Q>  
 
If max *, ,Q Qz P PP P
⎧ ⎫⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥=⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭  then * .
Qz PP
⎢ ⎥< ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  Expression ( )7  implies that 
( ) ( )1 ,H Q H Q j=  and 1 , .Q QH P H P jP P⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥=⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠  It follows from the strict concavity of 
( )1 ,H Q j over Q and the fact that *,Q P zP⎢ ⎥ >⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  we have ( )1 1, , ,
QH P j H Q jP
⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥ >⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠  which 
implies ( ).QH P H QP⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥ >⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠             ■ 
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Lemma 6 Let Q be an order quantity such that * *z Q q< <  and ( )1 ,R jP Q j Ps + ≤ < +  
{ }0 .j +∈ ∪Z  Then, we have ( )min *, .QH q P H QP⎛ ⎞⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤ >⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎩ ⎭⎝ ⎠  
 
Proof: If min *, *,Qq P qP
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤ =⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎩ ⎭  then PjqQjPs
R )1( +<<≤+ ∗ . In this case, we have 
( ) ( )2* *, 1H q H q j= +  and ( ) ( )2 , 1 .H Q H Q j= +  Since q* is the maximizer of ( )2 , 1H Q j +  
over Q, it follows that ( ) ( )2 2*, 1 , 1 ,H q j H Q j+ > +  and hence, ( ) ( )* .H q H Q>  
 
If min *, ,Q Qq P PP P
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤=⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎩ ⎭  then * .
Qq PP
⎡ ⎤> ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥  It follows from the strict concavity of 
( )2 ,H Q j over Q and the fact that *,Q P qP⎡ ⎤ <⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥  we have ( )2 2, 1 , 1 ,
QH P j H Q jP
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ + > +⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  
which implies ( ).QH P H QP⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ >⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠            ■ 
 
Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 imply that among the order quantities between z* and q*, we should 
only consider full truck loads. The following theorem provides a characterization of the 
retailer’s optimal order quantity. 
 
Theorem 1  The order quantity which maximizes ( )H Q  is given by 
( )* ,Q R s = arg max ( ) ( ) ( ) * ** *,..., , ...,* , * , . . , .q qz zP P P PH z H q H kP s t k k⎧ ⎫⎧ ⎫⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤    =  ∈⎨ ⎨ ⎬⎬⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭⎩ ⎭  
 
Proof: The proof follows from Lemmas ( ) ( ) ( )3 , 4 , 5   and ( )6 .  
 
 The above theorem implies that the retailer does not use the LTL carrier if both z* and 
q* are full truck loads. The LTL carrier would generate some revenue from the business of the 
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retailer only if the retailer orders z* and z* is realizable, or if the retailer orders q* and q* is 
not realizable. Because in all other cases, the retailer uses only the TL carrier. The following 
lemma further shows that in the second case (i.e., ( )* , *Q R s q=  and q* is not realizable), the 
quantity shipped using the LTL carrier is zero. 
 
Lemma 7 If there exists j, { }0j +∈ ∪Z  such that ,jP
s
R* qjP +<≤  that is q* is not 
realizable, then the retailer orders q* only if q* is an integer number of  full truck loads.  
 
Proof: Assume by the way of contradiction that the retailer orders q* and q* is not a full 
truckload. Since * ,RjP q jPs< < +  we have ( ) ( )1* *, .H q H q j=  It follows from the strict 
concavity of ( )1 ,H Q j  and the fact that * *,z q<  there exists Q  such that 
* RjP Q q jPs< < < +  and 1 1
* *, *, .q q
P P
H Q H q⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥>⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠  Note also that, we have 
( ) 1 *, .qPH Q H Q⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥= ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠  Therefore, ( ) ( )* ,H Q H q>   and hence, q* cannot be retailer’s 
optimal order quantity.            ■ 
 
Lemma 8 If ∃ { }0j +∈ ∪Z  such that ( )* 1 ,R jP z j Ps + ≤ < +  that is if z* is not realizable, 
then it is not optimal. 
 
Proof: If z* is not realizable, then we have ( )* 1R jP z j Ps + ≤ < +  for some { }0 .j +∈ ∪Z  
This implies that ( ) ( )2* *, 1 .H z H z j= +  Since * *z q<  and q* is the maximizer of 
( )2 , 1 ,H Q j +  it follows that there exists Q  such that ( )* 1z Q j P< < +  and 
( ) ( )2 2, 1 *, 1 .H Q j H z j+ > +  This further leads to ( ) ( )* ,H Q H z>  and hence, z* cannot be 
optimal.              ■ 
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The optimum order quantity of the retailer can also be characterized using the order 
quantity Q that maximizes the following function. 
 
( ) ( ) .TL QH Q G Q RP
⎡ ⎤= − ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥  
 
Let *TLQ  be the maximizer of the above function. Note that, *TLQ  is the optimal order 
quantity of the retailer if the TL carrier was the only transporter available. The value of *TLQ  
is derived by Toptal [22] and is given by the following expression. 
 
  ( ) ( )( ){ }arg max , 1TL TLH mP H m P +   if  ≠ ∅F  
   *TLQ =                     ( )32
  ( ) ( )( ){ }arg max * , 1TL TLH q H l P −   if  = ∅F  
 
where * ,q
P
l ⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥  { } ( )( ) ( ) ( ){ }0,1,2,... : 1 , 1 *k G k P G kP R k P q= ∈     + − ≤   + ≤F  and 
{ }min s.t.m k k=     ∈F  when .≠ ∅F  
 
As it is implied from Expression (32), *TLQ may have two alternative values. If 
≠ ∅F , it may be either mP or Pm )1( + , or both of them. Similarly, if = ∅F  then *TLQ may 
be either q* or * 1q P
P
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ , or both of them. In the following characterization for ( )* ,Q R s , 
*TLQ refers to any one of these maximizers.  
 
Proposition 1 Given the values of * , *TLQ z  and q*, we have the following: 
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1. If  * *,TLQ z<  then ( )* , *.Q R s z=  
2. If  ≤* z *TLQ * q≤ ,  then ( )* , *Q R s z=  or ( ) ** , .TLQ R s Q=  
 
Proof: We start the proof by pointing out that we have ( )TLH Q = 2 , .QH Q P⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  Observe 
also that, if * *,TLQ z<  then *TLQ  is a full truck load and z* is realizable. The first result 
follows due to Lemma 2 and Expression ( )32 ,  and leads to 
( )*TLH Q = ( )1 2* ** * *, , .TLTL TLTL TL TLQ QP PH Q H Q H Q⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠  The second result follows, 
because, otherwise we would have ( ) ( )2 ** *, ,zH z H z P⎡ ⎤=  ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥  but now Lemma 3 would imply 
that ( )2 2 ****, , ,TLTL QPzH z H QP ⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ > ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎝ ⎠  which contradicts with the fact that *TLQ  is a 
maximizer of ( ).TLH Q  Therefore, z* is realizable and we have ( ) ( )1 ** *, .zPH z H z ⎢ ⎥=  ⎣ ⎦  
Recall from Theorem 1 that, ( )* ,Q R s  can be z* or q* or any full truck load between those 
quantities. In the remaining part of the proof for the first case (i.e., * *TLQ z< ), we will first 
show that ( ) ( )* ,H z H kP>  for ** ,..., .qzP Pk ⎧ ⎫⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤∈ ⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭  Then, we will show that 
( ) ( )* * .H z H q>  
 
 Let us start with kP values such that ** ,..., .qz
P P
k ⎧ ⎫⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤∈ ⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭  Note that, we have 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2, , .TLH kP H kP k H kP k H kP= = =  Since *TLQ  is a maximizer of ( ) ,TLH Q  we 
have ( ) ( )* ,TL TLTLH Q H kP≥  which implies ( ) ( )* .TLH Q H kP≥  It follows from Lemma 3 
that ( ) ( )** ,TLH z H Q>  hence, ( ) ( )* .H z H kP>  
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In order to show that ( ) ( )* * ,H z H q>  we will consider two cases, that is q* is 
realizable and q* is not realizable. If q* is realizable, then 
( ) ( )2 ** *, * .TLqH q H q H qP⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤=  =⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  Since *TLQ  is a maximizer of ( ) ,TLH Q  we have 
( ) ( )* * ,TL TLTLH Q H q≥  and hence, ( ) ( )* * .TLH Q H q≥  Using Lemma 3, it follows that 
( ) ( ) ( )** * .TLH z H Q H q> >  If q* is not realizable, then we either have 
* ** *z z
P P
RP z q Ps +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥≤  <  < ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  or *q
RP Psk k≤   < +  for { } *0 , .zPk k+ ⎢ ⎥∈ ∪   > ⎣ ⎦Z  In the first 
case, since z* is the maximizer of ( )1 *, ,zPH Q ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  we have ( ) ( )1 1* **, *, ,z zP PH z H q⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥>⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  and 
hence, ( ) ( )* * .H z H q>  In the second case, we will use the earlier result in this proof that 
( ) ( )*H z H kP>  and the fact that ( )1 ,H Q k  is decreasing in the region where                  
Q ∈  ), .RkP kPs⎡  +⎢⎣  The latter implies that ( ) ( )1 1, *, ,H kP k H q k>  and therefore, 
( ) ( )* .H kP H q>  Combining this with the fact that ( ) ( )* ,H z H kP>  we further conclude 
that ( ) ( )* * .H z H q>  This completes the proof for the first part of the proposition, i.e., 
* *.TLQ z<  
 
Now, let us consider the second part of the proposition. Since *TLQ  maximizes 
( ) ,TLH Q  it follows that ( )2 2** , , ,TLTL Q PH Q H kP k
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ ≥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠
 k∀  such that 
{ }** ,..., , 0 .qzP Pk k +⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤= ∈ ∪⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ Z  We have ( ) 2
*
* * , TLTL TL
Q
P
H Q H Q
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤≥ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠
 and 
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( ) ( )2 , ,H kP H kP k=  therefore, ( ) ( )* .TLH Q H kP≥  It follows from Theorem 1 that it 
suffices to consider z* and *TLQ  for finding a solution for ( )* , .Q R s       ■ 
 
The following corollary indicates that if ** *TLz Q q< ≤  and z* is not realizable, then the 
retailer should order the quantity that would maximize his/her expected profits if the TL 
carrier was the only transporter available.  
 
Corollary 1 If ** *TLz Q q< ≤  and z* is not realizable, ( ) ** , .TLQ R s Q=   
 
Proof: It follows from Proposition 1 that if ** *,TLz Q q< ≤  then ( )* ,Q R s  is either z* or 
* .TLQ  Since z* is not realizable, we have ( ) ( )2 ** *, .zPH z H z ⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥  Note also that, by 
definition, ( ) ( )2 ** *, .TL zPH z H z ⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥  Since *TLQ  maximizes ( ) ,TLH Q  we further have 
( ) ( )* * ,TL TLTLH Q H z>  and hence, ( ) ( )* * .TL TLH Q H z>  Combining this with the fact that, 
( ) ( )2 ** * *, TL TLTL TL TLQH Q H Q H QP⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤⎜ ⎟≥ =⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  leads to ( ) ( )* * .TLH Q H z>       ■ 
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Chapter 5 
 
TRANSPORTATION PRICING PROBLEMS 
 
 
In this chapter, we study the transportation pricing problems faced by the TL carrier 
and the LTL carrier. Recall that, we define the transportation pricing problem of the TL 
carrier as determining the value of the per truck price R  that maximizes the TL carrier’s 
expected profits under the optimal response of the retailer, for a given price schedule of the 
LTL carrier (i.e., unit shipping price s ). A formulation of this problem is provided in Chapter 
3 and is referred to as Problem TLP. Similarly, we define the transportation pricing problem 
of the LTL carrier as determining the value of the unit shipping price s  to maximize the LTL 
carrier’s expected profits under the optimal response of the retailer, for a given price schedule 
of the TL carrier (i.e., per truck price R ). A formulation of this problem is presented in 
Chapter 3 and is referred to as Problem LTLP. 
 
Solving the transportation pricing problems of the TL and the LTL carrier exhibits 
certain challenges primarily due to the piecewise structure of the retailer’s expected profit 
function. As discussed in Chapter 4, there is no simple analytical expression for ( )* ,Q R s . 
However, we have developed two different characterizations of the optimal solution through 
showing some structural properties of the objective function. In our following analysis for the 
transportation pricing problems, we will follow a similar approach. Based on our earlier 
results, we will further simplify the formulations of these problems, which will lead us to the 
optimal solutions. We first start with the TL carrier’s pricing problem.  
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5.1 TL Carrier’s Transportation Pricing Problem 
 
In this section, we study the problem of the TL carrier in deciding the value of R. In 
our analysis, we solve TLP for the general demand distribution. We note that, for a specific 
demand distribution the solution may further be simplified. Two general constraints that we 
impose on the selection of R  are: i) sPR <  and ii) 0≥R .  
 
The approach that we follow in solving TLP utilizes the first characterization of the 
retailer’s optimal solution which we have derived in Chapter 4. This solution is stated in 
Theorem 1. It is implied by this theorem that ( )* ,Q R s  can be z*, or q* or any full truck load 
between those quantities. Considering this implication, we divide all possible values of  R  
(all real numbers such that sPR < and 0≥R ) into three groups and proceed our analysis 
thereafter. More specifically, we optimize out of all feasible R values which lead to z*. 
Secondly, we optimize over all feasible R values which lead to an optimal replenishment 
quantity of the retailer given by kP , where ** ,..., qz
P P
k ⎧ ⎫⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤∈ ⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭  and is an integer value. 
Thirdly, we solve TLP over all feasible R values which lead to q* as the optimal 
replenishment quantity of the retailer. Finally, among these solutions, we choose the R value 
which results in the maximum expected profits for the TL carrier. It is important to note that 
the reason why we use the first characterization for ( )* ,Q R s  is that, the possible values for 
the optimal solution of the retailer (i.e., z*, or q* or any full truck load in between) is 
independent of the specific value of R  for fixed s . 
 
In what follows, we first present Proposition 2, Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 to 
identify the feasible R values which lead to each type of solution discussed above. Then, we 
formulate the three subproblems and discuss their solutions.    
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Proposition 2 The optimal replenishment quantity of the retailer is given by q* if and only if 
we have ( )2 1 ***, *, zPqH q H zP⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥≥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  and ( )2 1**, ,qH q H kP kP⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ ≥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  k∀  such that 
** ,..., qz
P P
k ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ . 
 
Proof: We first prove that if q* is optimal then ( )2 1 ***, *, zPqH q H zP⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥≥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  and 
( )2 1**, ,qH q H kP kP⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ ≥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  k∀  such that 
** ,..., qz
P P
k ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ . The proof will be complete by 
showing that if ( )2 1 ***, *, zPqH q H zP⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥≥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  and ( )2 1**, ,qH q H kP kP⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ ≥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  k∀  such that 
** ,..., qz
P P
k ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ , then q* is optimal. Let us start with the first part of the proof. 
 
 Since q* maximizes the retailer’s expected profits, we have ( ) ( )1 ** *, zPH q H z ⎢ ⎥≥ ⎣ ⎦  
and ( ) ( )1* ,H q H kP k≥  k∀  such that ** ,..., qzP Pk ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ . If q* is realizable, we further have 
( ) 2 ** *, qH q H q P⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤= ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ , which leads to ( )2 1 ***, *, zPqH q H zP⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥≥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  and 
( )2 1**, ,qH q H kP kP⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ ≥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  k∀  such that 
** ,..., qz
P P
k ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ .  If q* is not realizable while it is 
optimal, then Lemma 7 implies that it is given by an integer number of full truck loads.  In 
this case, we again have ( ) 2 ** *, qH q H q P⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤= ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ , and therefore, the result follows.    
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 Now, let us assume that ( )2 1 ***, *, zPqH q H zP⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥≥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  and ( )2 1**, ,qH q H kP kP⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ ≥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  
k∀  such that ** ,..., qz
P P
k ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ .  Note that we have ( )2
**, *TL
qH q H qP
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ =⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  and 
( ) ( ) ( )1 2, , TLH kP k H kP k H kP= = . This leads to ( ) ( )TL TLH q* H kP≥  k∀  such that 
** ,..., qz
P P
k ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ .  Using this result, Expression ( )32  implies that * *TLQ q= , and hence, 
( )2 2* **, *,q zH q H zP P⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤≥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ . Combining this with the fact that  ( )2 1 ***, *, zPqH q H zP⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥≥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  
further leads to ( ) ( ) z*H q* H≥ . Note also that  ( )2 1**, ,qH q H kP kP⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ ≥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  k∀  such that 
** ,..., qz
P P
k ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦  implies ( ) ( )*H q H kP≥ . Therefore, q* maximizes the retailer’s expected 
profit function.                                                 ■ 
 
Proposition 3  z* is optimal if and only if we have ( )1 2* **, *,zP qH z H q P⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ≥ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  and 
( ) ( )1 1**, ,zH z H kP kP⎢ ⎥ ≥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  k∀  such that ** ,..., qzP Pk ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ .   
 
Proof: We first prove that if z* is optimal then ( )1 2* **, *,zP qH z H q P⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ≥ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  and 
( ) ( )1 1**, ,zH z H kP kP⎢ ⎥ ≥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  k∀  such that ** ,..., qzP Pk ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ .  The proof will be complete by 
showing that if ( )1 2* **, *,zP qH z H q P⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ≥ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  and ( ) ( )1 1**, ,zH z H kP kP⎢ ⎥ ≥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  k∀  such that 
** ,..., qz
P P
k ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ , then z* is optimal. Let us start with the first part of the proof. 
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 If z* is optimal, then we have from Lemma 8 that z* is realizable, and therefore, 
( ) ( )1 ** *, zH z H z P⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . The optimality of z* further implies that ( ) 2 ** *, qH z H q P⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤≥ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  
and ( ) ( )1* ,H z H kP k≥  k∀  such that ** ,..., qzP Pk ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ .  Combining these two results lead 
to  ( )1 2* **, *,zP qH z H q P⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ≥ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  and ( ) ( )1 1**, ,zH z H kP kP⎢ ⎥ ≥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  k∀  such that 
** ,..., qz
P P
k ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ .   
  
Now, let us assume that ( )1 2* **, *,zP qH z H q P⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ≥ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  and ( ) ( )1 1**, ,zH z H kP kP⎢ ⎥ ≥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
k∀  such that ** ,..., qz
P P
k ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ .  If * *TLQ z< , then Proposition 1 implies that z* maximizes 
the retailer’s expected profits. If * *TLQ z≥ , we have from Expression ( )32  that *TLQ  is 
given by q* or kP  such that ** ,..., qz
P P
k ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ . Since ( ) ( )1 ,H kP H kP k=  and 
( ) ( )1 1**, ,zH z H kP kP⎢ ⎥ ≥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  k∀  such that ** ,..., qzP Pk ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ , we have ( ) ( )*H z H kP≥ . If q* 
is not realizable, Lemma 7 implies that it cannot be optimal, therefore, z* maximizes the 
retailer’s expected profits. If q* is realizable, then ( ) 2 ** *, qH q H q P⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤= ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ . Combining this 
with the fact that ( )1 2* **, *,zP qH z H q P⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ≥ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  leads to ( ) ( )* *H z H q≥ , and hence z* is 
optimal.                                                                                      ■ 
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Proposition 4 The optimal replenishment quantity of the retailer is given by kP, for some 
k +∈Z  and ** qz
P P
k ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤ ≤ ≤ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦  if and only if ( )1 2
*, *, qH kP k H q P
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤≥ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ , 
( ) ( )1 1 *, *, zH kP k H z P⎢ ⎥≥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  and ( ) ( )1 1, ,H kP k H jP j≥  ** ,..., qzP Pj ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤∀ = ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ . 
 
Proof: We first prove that if kP is optimal then ( )1 2 *, *, qH kP k H q P⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤≥ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ , 
( ) ( )1 1 *, *, zH kP k H z P⎢ ⎥≥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  and ( ) ( )1 1, ,H kP k H jP j≥  ** ,..., qzP Pj ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤∀ = ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ . The proof will be 
complete by showing that if ( )1 2 *, *, qH kP k H q P⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤≥ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ , ( ) ( )1 1 *, *, zH kP k H z P⎢ ⎥≥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  and 
( ) ( )1 1, ,H kP k H jP j≥  ** ,..., qzP Pj ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤∀ = ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ , then kP is optimal. Let us start with the first part 
of the proof.  
 
Recall that we have ( ) ( )1 ,H kP H kP k= .  Since kP is optimal, it follows that 
( ) 2 **, qH kP H q P⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤≥ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ , ( ) ( )1 **, zH kP H z P⎢ ⎥≥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  and ( ) ( )1 ,H kP H jP j≥  ** ,..., qzP Pj ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤∀ = ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ . 
This in turn implies that ( )1 2 *, *, qH kP k H q P⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤≥ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ , ( ) ( )1 1 *, *, zH kP k H z P⎢ ⎥≥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  and 
( ) ( )1 1, ,H kP k H jP j≥  ** ,..., qzP Pj ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤∀ = ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ . 
  
Now, let us assume that ( )1 2 *, *, qH kP k H q P⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤≥ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ , ( ) ( )1 1 *, *, zH kP k H z P⎢ ⎥≥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  and 
( ) ( )1 1, ,H kP k H jP j≥  ** ,..., qzP Pj ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤∀ = ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ . Since ( ) ( )1 ,H kP k H kP=  and ( ) ( )1 ,H jP j H jP= , 
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it follows that we have ( ) 2 **, qH kP H q P⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤≥ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ,  ( ) ( )1 **, zH kP H z P⎢ ⎥≥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ and ( ) ( )H kP H jP≥  
** ,..., qz
P P
j ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤∀ = ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ . If z* is realizable, then ( ) ( )1 **, zH kP H z P⎢ ⎥≥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  implies that 
( ) ( )*H kP H z≥ . In this case, if q* is also realizable, then ( ) 2 **, qH kP H q P⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤≥ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  implies 
( ) ( )*H kP H q≥ , and hence,  kP is optimal. If q* is not realizable, then by Lemma 7, q* 
would be optimal only if it is an integer multiple of a full truck load. Even in this case, 
( ) ( )H kP H jP≥  ** ,..., qzP Pj ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤∀ = ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦  implies that ( ) ( )*H kP H q≥ , therefore, kP is also 
optimal. If q* is not realizable and is not an integer multiple of a full truck load, then it cannot 
be optimal, therefore, ( ) ( )H kP H jP≥  ** ,..., qzP Pj ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤∀ = ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦  together with ( ) ( )*H kP H z≥  
guarantees that kP is optimal. If z* is not realizable, we know from Lemma 8 that it cannot be 
optimal. In this case, if q* is realizable, then ( ) 2 **, qH kP H q P⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤≥ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  implies that 
( ) ( )*H kP H q≥ . Combining with the fact that ( ) ( )H kP H jP≥  ** ,..., qzP Pj ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤∀ = ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ , we 
conclude that  kP is optimal. If q* is not realizable, then by Lemma 7, q* would be optimal 
only if it is an integer multiple of a full truck load. Even in this case, ( ) ( )H kP H jP≥  
** ,..., qz
P P
j ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤∀ = ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦  implies that ( ) ( )*H kP H q≥ , therefore, kP is also optimal. If q* is not 
realizable and is not an integer multiple of a full truck load, then it cannot be optimal. 
Therefore, ( ) ( )H kP H jP≥  ** ,..., qzP Pj ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤∀ = ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦  guarantees that kP is optimal.                     ■ 
 
Before we characterize the solution to TLP by using Proposition 2, Proposition 3 and 
Proposition 4, let us define some new notation. Let ( )R* q*  be the value of R  which 
maximizes the TL carrier’s expected profits among all feasible R values that lead to q* as the 
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optimal replenishment quantity of the retailer. Similarly, let ( )R* z*  be the value of R which 
maximizes the TL carrier’s expected profits among all feasible R values that lead to z* as the 
optimal replenishment quantity of the retailer. Finally, let ( )kPR*  be the value of R which 
maximizes the TL carrier’s expected profits among all feasible R values that lead to kP as the 
optimal replenishment quantity of the retailer, k ranging from *z
P
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥  to 
*q
P
⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ .  
Note that we have by Proposition 2 that ( )R* q*  is the solution the following model: 
Problem P1: 
max
R
 ( )*,TL q R∏  
 
 s.t.  ( )2 1 ***, *, zPqH q H zP⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥≥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ,  
( )2 1**, ,qH q H kP kP⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ ≥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ , 
** ,..., .qz
P P
k ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦  
sPR < , 
0.R ≥    
 
Similarly, we have from Proposition 3 that ( )R* z*  is the solution to the following 
model: 
Problem P2: 
max
R
 ( )*,TL z R∏  
 
 s.t.  ( )1 2* **, *,zP qH z H q P⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ≥ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ,  
( ) ( )1 1**, ,zH z H kP kP⎢ ⎥ ≥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ , ** ,..., .qzP Pk ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦  
sPR < , 
0.R ≥    
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Finally, we have from Proposition 4 that for any integer value of k such that 
** qz
P P
k ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤ ≤ ≤ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ , ( )kPR*  is the solution to the following model:  
Problem P3: 
max
R
 ( ),TL kP R∏  
 s.t.   
( )1 2 *, *, qH kP k H q P⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤≥ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ , 
( ) ( )1 1 *, *, zH kP k H z P⎢ ⎥≥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ,  
( ) ( )1 1, ,H kP k H jP j≥ , ** ,..., .qzP Pj ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦  
sPR < , 
0.R ≥    
 
The following corollary characterizes the optimal solution of problem TLP. 
 
Corollary 2 The solution to TLP is given by the value of the per truck cost R among ( )R* q* , 
( )R* z*  and ( )kPR*  k∀ such that ** qzP Pk ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤ ≤ ≤ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ , which gives the maximum expected 
profits for the TL carrier. In other words, the solution to TLP is the second argument of the 
function which attains the following at its computed value 
 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) * *max *, * , *, * , , . . .TL TL TL z qP Pq R* q z R* z kP R* kP k s t k⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥   ∀   ≤ ≤  ⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭∏ ∏ ∏  
 
 In what follows, we provide simplified expressions for obtaining ( )R* q* , ( )R* z*  
and ( )kPR*  k∀ such that ** qz
P P
k ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤ ≤ ≤ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦  as solutions to the mathematical formulations 
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presented earlier in the chapter.  These results are presented next in Lemma 9, Lemma 10 and 
Lemma 11. The proofs of these lemmas are in the Appendix.  
 
Lemma 9 The value of R  which maximizes the TL carrier’s expected profits among all 
feasible R values that lead to q* as the optimal replenishment quantity of the retailer, that is 
( )R* q* , is given by 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) **** * * *min , , ,  . . 
* **
qz
P P
zG q G z sz sP G q G kPP sP k s t k
q qz kP P P
⎧ ⎫⎢ ⎥− + −⎪ ⎪−⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎡ ⎤ − ε   ∀ ≤ ≤⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪− −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎩ ⎭
 
 
where ε is a positive real number and q* kP ≠ for the  integer values of k that are in 
consideration.   
    
Lemma 10 The value of R  which maximizes the TL carrier’s expected profits among all 
feasible R values that lead to z* as the optimal replenishment quantity of the retailer, that is 
( )R* z* , is given by sP − ε  where ε is a positive real number. 
 
Lemma 11 The value of R  which maximizes the TL carrier’s expected profits among all 
feasible R values that lead to kP ** is an integer such that  qz
P P
k k⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤ ≤ ≤⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠  as the optimal 
replenishment quantity of the retailer, that is ( )kPR* , is given by 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) *** *min , , ,  . . 1
*
z
P
zG kP G z sz sP G kP G jPP sP j s t j kk jzk P
⎧ ⎫⎢ ⎥− + − −⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦ ⎡ ⎤ − ε   ∀ ≤ ≤ −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥−⎢ ⎥−⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
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where ε is a positive real number.   
 
5.2 LTL Carrier’s Transportation Pricing Problem 
 
In this section, we study the problem of the LTL carrier in deciding the value of s. 
This problem is referred to as Problem LTLP in Chapter 3. Two general constraints that we 
impose on the selection of s are: i) sPR <  and ii) 0≥s . In what follows next, based on our 
analysis in Chapter 4, we will prove a proposition which will later be used to simplify the 
formulation presented in Chapter 3 for Problem LTLP. The following proposition identifies 
the condition for z* to be optimal. 
 
Proposition 5  z* is optimal if and only if ( )1 2 ** **, , .TLTLzP QH z H Q P⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ≥ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  
  
Proof: We will first proof that if ( )1 2 ** **, , ,TLTLzP QH z H Q P⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ≥ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  then z* is optimal. The 
proof will be complete by showing that if z* is optimal, then 
( )1 2 ** **, , .TLTLzP QH z H Q P⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ≥ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  
 
Let us start with the first part. Recall that we have  ( ) ( )2 **, *TLzPH z H z⎡ ⎤ =⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥  and 
( )2 ** *, .TL TLTL TLQH Q H QP⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ =⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  Combining this with the fact that ( ) ( )* *TL TLTLH Q H z≥  
leads to ( )2 2** *, *, ,TLTL Q zH Q H zP P⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤≥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  and hence, ( ) ( )1 2* **, *, .z zH z H zP P⎢ ⎥ ⎡ ⎤≥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥  
This further implies that ( ) ( )1 ** *, .zH z H z P⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  It follows from Expression ( )32  that *TLQ  
 48
is either a multiple of a full truck load { }( )*i.e., , 0,1, 2,... ,TLQ kP k  =   ∈  or not, in which case 
it is equal to q*. In the first case, we have ( ) 2 1* ** * *, , .TL TLTL TL TLQ QH Q H Q H QP P⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥= =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠  
Since ( )1 2 ** **, , TLTLzP QH z H Q P⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ≥ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  and ( ) ( )1 ** *, ,zPH z H z ⎢ ⎥= ⎣ ⎦  it follows that, 
( ) ( )** .TLH z H Q≥  Recall from Proposition 1 that z* and *TLQ  are two possible solutions 
for ( )* , .Q R s  As ( ) ( )** ,TLH z H Q≥  it turns out that ( )* , *.Q R s z=  In the second case 
{ }( )*. ., 0,1, 2,... such that  ,TLi e k Q kP ∃ ∈  =  assume that z* is not optimal. Then, it follows 
from Lemma 7 that q* is realizable, which in turn implies that ( ) 2 ** *, .qH q H q P⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤= ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  
Because ( )1 2* **, *,zP qH z H q P⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ≥ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  and ( ) ( )1 ** *, ,zPH z H z ⎢ ⎥= ⎣ ⎦  this leads to 
( ) ( )* * .H z H q≥  However, this contradicts with the assumption that z* is not optimal. 
 
Now, let us consider the second part of the proof, i.e., z* is optimal. Assume that 
( )1 2 ** **, , .TLTLzP QH z H Q P⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ < ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  This implies that z* is not realizable, because otherwise, 
we would have ( ) ( )1 ** *, zPH z H z ⎢ ⎥= ⎣ ⎦  which in turn leads to ( ) 2 *** , ,TLTL QH z H Q P⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤< ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  
however this contradicts with the optimality of z*. Yet, we have from Lemma 8 that, if z* is 
not realizable then it is not optimal. Therefore, if z* is optimal then we should have 
( )1 2 ** **, , .TLTLzP QH z H Q P⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ≥ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠            ■ 
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We know from Theorem 1 and Lemma 7 that the retailer does business with the LTL 
carrier only if he/she orders z*. For all other quantities, the quantity shipped using the LTL 
carrier is 0. Therefore, the value s that maximizes the LTL carrier’s expected profits should be 
looked for among all feasible values which lead to z* as the optimal solution of the retailer. 
Proposition 5 suggests a necessary and sufficient condition for z* to be optimal using the 
second characterization of the solution for the retailer’s replenishment problem. Notice that 
the second characterization is based on *
TL
Q , which does not depend on the decision variable 
s. 
 
Problem P4: 
max
s
 ( )( )* ,LTL z s sΠ   
 s.t.   
 ( ) ( )1 2** , * ,  TLTL
Q*z s
H z s H QP P
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ≥ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
, 
.R s RP < <  
Our contribution in analyzing the LTL carrier’s transportation problem is to come up 
with alternative formulations. Solving the above problem for general demand distribution, as 
we did it for the TL carrier, exhibits certain challenges. These challenges are mainly due to 
the complexity of the retailer’s replenishment problem and the fact that z* depends on the 
decision variable s.  
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Chapter 6 
 
NUMERICAL RESULTS 
 
 
In this chapter, we present some numerical results for the setting of interest in this thesis. The 
objectives of this numerical study are as follows:  
 
i) To illustrate an application of the solution for the retailer’s optimization problem, 
ii) To show the implication of jointly considering inventory and transportation costs 
in the same problem for the retailer, 
iii) To quantify the savings for the TL carrier that can be achieved through carefully 
deciding on the value of the shipping price per truck, i.e., R , 
iv) To quantify the savings for the LTL carrier that can be achieved through carefully 
deciding on the value of the shipping price per unit, i.e., s, 
v) To show the opportunity for savings that could originate from a coordination of 
transportation pricing decisions between a TL carrier and an LTL carrier. 
vi) To show the opportunity for savings that could originate from a coordination of 
transportation pricing decisions between a TL carrier and a retailer. 
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6.1 An Application of the Proposed Solution for the Retailer’s Optimization 
Problem 
 
In this section, we illustrate an application of Proposition 1 over a number of numerical 
instances (i.e., Example 1, Example 2, Example 3 and Example 4). 
 
Example 1: Consider a setting with a retailer, a TL carrier and an LTL carrier with the 
following parameters: c = 16, r = 32, v = 11, b = 14, P = 250, R = 180, s = 2, X = Uniform (0, 
1000).  
 
 Under the given parameters, we have 2( ) 0.0175 30 7000G Q Q Q= − + − . Therefore, 
800z* =  and 857.14.q* =  The retailer’s expected profit function is given by  
 
( )
( )
2
2
0.0175 28 7000 320                 if   250 250 90
0.0175 30 7180 180 if    250 90 250 1 .
Q Q i i Q i
H Q
Q Q i i Q i
⎧− + − + ≤ < +⎪= ⎨⎪− + − −                  + ≤ < +⎩
 
 
Figure 6.1 shows a plot of the above function. The maximizer of 
2( ) 0.0175 30 7000 180250TL
QH Q Q Q ⎡ ⎤= − + − − ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ , i.e., 
*
TLQ , is equal to 857.14. Since 
** ,TLz Q<  it follows from Proposition 1 that, ( )* ,Q R s  is either z* or *TLQ . We have    
( )800 5160H =  and ( )857.14 5137.14H =  Therefore, ( )* , * 800.Q R s z= =  
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Figure 6.1 Plot of the retailer’s expected profit function in Example 1 
 
Example 2: Consider a setting with a retailer, a TL carrier and an LTL carrier with the 
following parameters: c = 18, r = 32, v = 11, b = 14, P = 90, R = 210, s = 5, X = Uniform (0, 
1000).  
 
Under the given parameters, we have 7000280175.0)( 2 −+−= QQQG . Therefore, 
657z* =  and 800.q* =  The retailer’s expected profit function is given by 
 
( )
( )
2
2
0.0175 23 7000 240                  if   90 90 42
0.0175 28 7210 210                  if    90 42 90 1 .
Q Q i i Q i
H Q
Q Q i i Q i
⎧− + − + ≤ < +⎪= ⎨⎪− + − − + ≤ < +⎩
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 shows a plot of the above function. The maximizer of 
2( ) 0.0175 28 7000 21090TL
QH Q Q Q ⎡ ⎤= − + − − ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ , i.e., 
*
TLQ , is equal to 720. Since z* < *TLQ , 
it follows from Proposition 1 that, ( )* ,Q R s  is either z* or *TLQ .We have ( ) 14.2237657 =H  
and ( ) .2408720 =H  Therefore, ( ) ** , 720.TLQ R s Q= =  
 
5100 
5110 
5120 
5130 
5140 
5150 
5160 
744 772 800 828 856 884 
Q
H(Q) 
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                          Figure 6.2 Plot of the retailer’s expected profit function in Example 2 
 
Example 3: Consider a setting with a retailer, a TL carrier and an LTL carrier with the 
following parameters: c = 18, r = 32, v = 11, b = 14, P = 75, R = 50, s = 1, X = Uniform (0, 
1000).  
 
Under the given parameters, we have 7000280175.0)( 2 −+−= QQQG . Therefore, 
771.43z* =  and 800.q* =  The retailer’s expected profit function is given by 
 
( )
( )
2
2
0.0175 27 7000 25                  if   75 75 50
0.0175 28 7050 50                  if    75 50 75 1 .
Q Q i i Q i
H Q
Q Q i i Q i
⎧− + − + ≤ < +⎪= ⎨⎪− + − − + ≤ < +⎩
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 shows a plot of the above function. The maximizer of 
2( ) 0.0175 28 7000 5075TL
QH Q Q Q ⎡ ⎤= − + − − ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ , i.e., 
*
TLQ , is equal to 750. Since * *,TLQ z<  it 
follows from Proposition 1 that, ( )* , 771.43.Q R s z*  = =    
 
2050 
2100 
2150 
2200 
2250 
2300 
2350 
2400 
600 615 630 645 660 675 690 705 720 735 750 765 780 795 810 825 840
Q
H(Q) 
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Figure 6.3 Plot of the retailer’s expected profit function in Example 3 
 
 
 
Example 4: Consider a setting with a retailer, a TL carrier and an LTL carrier with the 
following parameters: c = 14, r = 32, v = 11, b = 14, P = 250, R = 200, s = 2, X = Uniform (0, 
1000).  
 
Under the given parameters, we have 7000320175.0)( 2 −+−= QQQG . Therefore, 
857.14z* =  and 914.29.q* =  The retailer’s expected profit function is given by 
 
( )
( )
2
2
0.0175 30 7000 300                  if   250 250 100
0.0175 32 7200 200                  if    250 100 250 1 .
Q Q i i Q i
H Q
Q Q i i Q i
⎧− + − + ≤ < +⎪= ⎨⎪− + − − + ≤ < +⎩
 
 
 
Figure 6.4 shows a plot of the above function. The maximizer of 
2( ) 0.0175 32 7000 200250TL
QH Q Q Q ⎡ ⎤= − + − − ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ , i.e., 
*
TLQ , is equal to 914.29. Since *TLQ = 
q*, it follows from Proposition 1 that ( ) sR,*Q  is either z* or *TLQ .  We have 
3600 
3610 
3620 
3630 
3640 
3650 
3660 
3670 
723 735 747 759 771 783 795 807 819 831 843
Q
H(Q) 
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( )3×250+100 857.14 < 3 +1 250< z* = × , therefore, z* is not realizable. Corollary 1 implies 
that in this case z* cannot be optimal, and hence, ( )* ,Q R s  = *TLQ = 914.29. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Plot of the retailer’s expected profit function in Example 4 
 
6.2 The Impact of Jointly Considering Inventory and Transportation Costs 
 
Recent supply chain studies promote the joint modelling and optimization of inventory and 
transportation costs. One of the premises of this thesis lies in the fact that substantial savings 
can be achieved by the retailer through this consideration. With this in mind, in Chapter 4 of 
this thesis, we analyzed the retailer’s problem in detail taking into account replenishment and 
transportation costs simultaneously. The purpose of this section is to quantify the savings that 
can be achieved through this joint modelling in comparison to a hierarchical approach.  
 
In the hierarchical approach, we assume that the retailer makes his/her replenishment 
decisions using a model which does not explicitly incorporate transportation costs. In this 
model, transportation costs are not jointly minimized with the replenishment costs. However, 
the retailer has an idea about the minimum and the maximum shipping cost per unit that 
would result from any order quantity. Therefore, he/she makes the decision regarding the 
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order quantity based on this rough idea of transportation costs. In order to quantify the savings 
from joint modelling, we compare the retailer’s corresponding optimum expected profits with 
those resulting from the hierarchical approach under the consideration of minimum and 
maximum shipping cost per unit. The retailer’s minimum shipping cost per unit is R P , which 
is realized when he/she purchases a quantity which is an integer multiple of a full truck load 
and utilizes only the TL carrier.   The retailer’s minimum shipping cost per unit is s, which is 
realized when he/she utilizes only the LTL carrier.    In the hierarchical approach, firstly, the 
retailer solves his/her replenishment problem both by incorporating the minimum per unit 
transportation cost R P  and  the maximum per unit transportation cost s. After that, he/she 
sets his/her optimal order quantity as the quantity which gives the maximum profit under 
these two considerations. More explicitly, let ( )1P Q  be the expected profit function of the 
retailer under the minimum transportation cost R P  and define *fQ as the maximizer of this 
function. Similarly, let ( )2P Q  be the expected profit function of the retailer under the 
minimum transportation cost s and define *gQ  as the maximizer of this function. That is, 
 
( ) ( )1 ,RP Q G Q QP= −  
( ) ( )2 ,P Q G Q sQ= −  
( ) ( )( )1 2arg max * , *f gQ P Q P Q=     
 
More specifically, we consider the following measure to show the improvement in the 
retailer’s expected profits as a result of jointly considering inventory and transportation costs: 
 
( )( ) ( )
( )
* ,
100%.
H Q R s H Q
H Q
− ×  
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The following two examples show that the savings due to joint modelling of inventory and 
transportation costs are in fact very significant in the problem setting of interest.  
 
Example 5: Consider a setting with a retailer, a TL carrier and an LTL carrier with the 
following parameters: c = 19, r = 32, v = 11, b = 14, P = 150, R = 400, s = 8, X = Uniform (0, 
1000).  
Under the given parameters, we have 2( ) 0.0175 27 7000,G Q Q Q= − + −  
( ) 21 0.0175 24.33 7000,P Q Q Q= − +  − ( ) 22 0.0175 19 7000,P Q Q Q= − + − 771.43,q* = * 695.14fQ =  
and * 542.85.gQ =  ( )1 695.14 1456.413P =  and ( )2 542.85 1842.86P = −  so 695.14.Q =  The 
retailer’s expected profit function is given by 
 
( )
( )
          
 .115050150   if                 4007400270175.0
50150150   if                  8007000190175.0
2
2
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
+<≤+−−+−
+<≤+−+−
=
 iQiiQQ
iQiiQQ
QH  
 
It can be shown that ( )* , 750Q R s  =  and the retailer’s expected profits at Q  and 
( )* ,Q R s  are equal to 1312.43 and 1406.25, respectively. Therefore, the percentage 
improvement that can be achieved due to joint optimization of inventory and transportation 
costs over hierarchical decision making is 7.14 % ((1406.25-1312.43)/1312.43×100%). 
 
Example 6: Consider a setting with a retailer, a TL carrier and an LTL carrier with the 
following parameters: c = 18, r = 32, v = 11, b = 14, P = 70, R = 280, s = 7, X = Uniform (0, 
1000).  
Under the given parameters, we have 2( ) 0.0175 28 7000,G Q Q Q= − + −  
( ) 21 0.0175 24 7000,P Q Q Q= − +  − ( ) 22 0.0175 21 7000,P Q Q Q= − + − 800,q* = * 685.71fQ  =  
and * 600.gQ =  ( )1 685.71 1228.571P =  and ( )2 600 700P = −  so 685.71.Q =  The retailer’s 
expected profit function is given by 
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( )
( )
2
2
0.0175 21 7000 210                  if   70 70 40
0.0175 28 7280 280                  if    70 40 70 1 .
Q Q i i Q i
H Q
Q Q i i Q i
⎧− + − + ≤ < +⎪= ⎨⎪− + − − + ≤ < +⎩
 
 
It can be shown that ( )* , 700Q R s  =  and the retailer’s expected profits at Q  and 
( )* ,Q R s are equal to 1171.41 and 1225, respectively. Therefore, the percentage improvement 
that can be achieved due to joint optimization of inventory and transportation costs over 
hierarchical decision making is 4.57 % ((1225-1171.41)/1171.41×100%). 
 
6.3 A Quantification of Savings for the TL Carrier due to Transportation Pricing 
 
 In Chapter 5, an analysis of the TL carrier’s transportation pricing problem is 
provided. In this section, we use the result presented in Corollary 2 of Chapter 5 to quantify 
the savings the TL carrier can achieve through carefully deciding the value of the shipping 
price per truck, i.e., R.  For this purpose, we use the following examples.  
 
Example 7: Consider a setting with a retailer, a TL carrier and an LTL carrier with the 
following parameters: c = 19, r = 32, v = 11, b = 14, P = 150, R  = 0, s = 8, s  = 0.1, 
100,TLK =  10,LTLK =  X = Uniform (0, 1000).  
 
Under the given parameters, we have 7000270175.0)( 2 −+−= QQQG , 542.86z* =  
and 771.43.q* =  Using Lemma 9, Lemma 10 and Lemma 11, we conclude that ( ) 8,R* q* =  
( ) 1200 ,R* z* = − ε  ( ) 86.11421504 =×R*  and ( ) 25.5061505 =×R* . We further have  
 
( )771.43, 8 52,TLΠ  = −  
( )542.86,1200 3500 ,TLΠ  − ε = − ε  
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( )600,1142.86 4471.44,TLΠ  =  and 
( )750, 506.25 2431.25.TLΠ  =  
 
Since ( )600,1142.86TLΠ   gives the maximum expected profit for the TL carrier, Corollary 2 
implies that the optimum value of R  should be 1142.86. 
 
 In Table 6.1, for various values of R , we report the retailer’s optimal order quantity, 
the TL carrier’s, the LTL carrier’s and the retailer’s corresponding expected profits. In 
contrary to the common belief that the higher the TL carrier sets his/her price within the 
feasible range, the better his/her expected profits are, the expected profits of the TL carrier at 
R  = 1142.86 are more than those at R  = 1199. In fact, the percentage difference in expected 
profits for the TL carrier by carefully determining the value of R , instead of setting it to the 
highest price, amounts to 27.86%.  
 
Table 6.1 Expected profits of the parties resulting from the retailer’s optimal replenishment decision 
for various values of R 
 
R Q*(R,s) *TLQ  ∏TL(Q*(R,s),R) H(Q*(R,s)) ∏LTL(Q*(R,s),s) 
8 771.43 771.43 -52 3366.2857 0 
100 750 750 400 2906.25 0 
200 750 750 900 2406.25 0 
300 750 750 1400 1906.25 0 
400 750 750 1900 1406.25 0 
500 750 750 2400 906.25 0 
506.25 750 750 2431.25 875 0 
600 600 600 2300 500 0 
700 600 600 2700 100 0 
800 600 600 3100 -300 0 
900 600 600 3500 -700 0 
1000 600 600 3900 -1100 0 
1100 600 600 4300 -1500 0 
1142.86 600 600 4471.44 -1671.44 0 
1199 542.86 450 3497 -1839.857 723.594 
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Example 8: Consider a setting with a retailer, a TL carrier and an LTL carrier with the 
following parameters: c = 18, r = 32, v = 11, b = 14, P = 70, 50,TLK =  10,LTLK =  5,R =  
3,s =  0.3s =  and X = Uniform (0,1000). 
 
Under the given parameters, we have 2( ) 0.0175 28 7000G Q Q Q= − + − , 
714.2857z* =  and 800.q* =  Using Lemma 9, Lemma 10 and Lemma 11, we conclude that 
( ) 15.75,R* q* =  ( ) 210R* z* = − ε  and ( )7 70 155.6785.R* × =  We further have  
 
( )800,15.75 79,TLΠ  =  
( )714.2857, 210 1995 ,TLΠ − ε = − ε  
( )770,155.6785 1637.4635.TLΠ  =  
 
Since ( )714.2857, 210TLΠ  − ε  gives the maximum expected profit for the TL carrier, 
Corollary 2 implies that the optimum value of R  should be 210 .− ε  
 
Table 6.2 Expected profits of the parties resulting from the retailer’s optimal replenishment 
decision for various values of R 
 
R Q*(R,s) *TLQ  ∏TL(Q*(R,s),R) H(Q*(R,s)) ∏LTL(Q*(R,s),s) 
10 800 800 10 4080 0 
15.75 800 800 79 3995.25 0 
20 770 770 115 3964.25 0 
30 770 770 225 3854.25 0 
40 770 770 335 3744.25 0 
50 770 770 445 3634.25 0 
100 770 770 995 3084.25 0 
150 770 770 1545 2534.25 0 
155.6785 770 770 1607.4635 2471.7865 0 
200 714.2857 700 1900 2028.571 28.571 
209 714.2857 700 1990 1938.571 28.571 
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 In Table 6.2, for various values of R , we report the retailer’s optimal order quantity, 
the TL carrier’s , the LTL carrier’s and the retailer’s corresponding expected profits. As it is 
seen in Table 6.2, for the given value of s the TL carrier can increase his/her profits by a 
factor of two, if she/he changes the per truck cost R from 100 to 209. This again illustrates the 
extent of savings that can be achieved by the TL carrier through carefully deciding on the 
value of per truck cost.  
 
6.4 A Quantification of Savings for the LTL Carrier due to Transportation 
Pricing 
 
The purpose of this section is to quantify the savings the LTL carrier can achieve 
through carefully deciding the value of the per unit shipping price, i.e., s.  For this purpose, 
we use the following examples. 
 
Example 9: Consider a setting with a retailer, a TL carrier and an LTL carrier with the 
following parameters: c = 16, r = 32, v = 11, b = 14, P = 250, R  = 0, s  = 1, 100,TLK =  
,30=LTLK  X = Uniform (0, 1000).   
 
Table 6.3 Expected profits of the parties resulting from the retailer’s optimal replenishment decision 
for various values of s and R = 120 
 
s Q*(R,s) z* Q2 ∏LTL(Q*(R,s),s) ∏TL(Q*(R,s),R) H(Q*(R,s)) 
1.2 822.857 822.857 72.857 -15.429 330 5389.1429 
1.37 818 818 68 -4.84 330 5377.1700 
1.371 857.143 817.971 0 0 450 5377.1429 
1.4 857.143 817.143 0 0 450 5377.1429 
1.6 857.143 811.429 0 0 450 5377.1429 
1.8 857.143 805.714 0 0 450 5377.1429 
2 857.143 800 0 0 450 5377.1429 
4 857.143 742.857 0 0 450 5377.1429 
6 857.143 685.714 0 0 450 5377.1429 
12 857.143 514.286 0 0 450 5377.1429 
16 857.143 400 0 0 450 5377.1429 
20 857.143 285.714 0 0 450 5377.1429 
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Under the given parameters, we have ( ) 7000300175.0 2 −+−= QQQG , 
857.143  q*  = and  * = 857.143.TLQ  The retailer’s optimal order quantity and the expected 
profits of all parties given  ,120=R  are summarized in Table 6.3 for varying values of s. 
 
For ,120=R  there is no value of s that would put the LTL carrier in a profitable 
position. Any s value that is greater than or equal to 1.371 will have the retailer order from the 
TL carrier and yield zero expected profits for the LTL carrier. Therefore, in this case, there 
are alternative optimal values.  
 
Table 6.4 Expected profits of the parties resulting from the retailer’s optimal replenishment decision 
for various values of s and R = 180 
 
s Q*(R,s) z* Q2 ∏LTL(Q*(R,s),s) ∏TL(Q*(R,s),R) H(Q*(R,s)) 
1.2 822.857 822.857 72.857 -15.429 510 5209.1429 
1.4 817.143 817.143 67.143 -3.143 510 5195.1429 
1.6 811.429 811.429 61.429 6.857 510 5182.2857 
1.8 805.714 805.714 55.714 14.571 510 5170.5714 
2 800 800 50 20 510 5160 
2.2 794.286 794.286 44.286 23.1432 510 5150.5714 
2.36 789.714 789.714 39.714 24.011 510 5143.8514 
2.37 789.429 789.429 39.429 24.0177 510 5143.4557 
2.38 789.143 789.143 39.143 24.0173 510 5143.0629 
2.4 788.571 788.571 38.571 23.9994 510 5142.2857 
2.41 788.286 788.286 38.286 23.9833 510 5141.9014 
2.54 784.571 784.571 34.571 23.2393 510 5137.1657 
2.55 784.286 784.286 0 0 690 5137.1429 
2.6 857.143 782.857 0 0 690 5137.1429 
2.8 857.143 771.143 0 0 690 5137.1429 
8 857.143 628.571 0 0 690 5137.1429 
16 857.143 400 0 0 690 5137.1429 
20 857.143 285.714 0 0 690 5137.1429 
 
 Now, let us consider the scenario where .180=R  Under the given parameters, we 
have ( ) 7000300175.0 2 −+−= QQQG , 857.143  q*  = and  * 857.143.TLQ =  The retailer’s 
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optimal order quantity and the expected profits of all parties are summarized in Table 6.4 for 
varying values of s. 
 
As it can be seen from Table 6.4, the optimal value of s that maximizes the LTL 
carrier’s expected profits under the optimal response of the retailer given R = 180, is 2.37. As 
the value of s gets smaller, the quantity that is shipped using the LTL carrier, i.e., Q2, 
increases. However, the expected profits of the LTL carrier decrease due to the decreasing 
marginal revenue from the shipment of a single unit. Table 6.4 also shows the impact of 
carefully deciding the value of s on the LTL carrier’s expected profits. For example, instead 
of setting the value of s to 2, the LTL carrier can increase his/her expected profits by 20% by 
setting the value of s to 2.37. Another observation is that if 55.2≥s , then the retailer does not 
use the services of the LTL carrier.  
 
 Now, let us consider the case where .300=R  Under the given parameters, we have 
( ) 7000300175.0 2 −+−= QQQG , 857.143  q*  = and * 750.TLQ =  The retailer’s optimal 
order quantity and the expected profits of all parties are summarized in Table 6.5 for varying 
values of s. 
 
The optimal value of s that maximizes the LTL carrier’s expected profits under the 
optimal response of the retailer given R = 300, is 2.37. Similar to our observations for R = 
180, it can be observed that as the value of s gets smaller, the quantity that is shipped using 
the LTL carrier, i.e., Q2, increases. However, the expected profits of the LTL carrier decrease 
due to the decreasing marginal revenue from the shipment of a single unit. In case of R = 300, 
the retailer does not use the services of the LTL carrier if 75.3≥s . 
 
 When the results in Table 6.3, Table 6.4 and Table 6.5 are compared, it can be 
observed that as the value of per truck cost R increases, the expected profit of the TL carrier 
increases and those of the retailer decreases. The LTL carrier, on the other hand, has an 
increased chance of improving his/her expected profits. However, as R gets larger, after a 
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certain point on, the optimal s value and the LTL carriers’ expected profits at the optimal 
solution do not change. It can also be observed that the TL carrier’s expected profits are 
nondecreasing in s.  
 
Table 6.5 Expected profits of the parties resulting from the retailer’s optimal replenishment decision 
for various values of s and R = 300 
 
s Q*(R,s) z* Q2 ∏LTL(Q*(R,s),s) ∏TL(Q*(R,s),R) H(Q*(R,s)) 
1.4 817.143 817.143 67.143 -3.143 870 4835.1429 
1.6 811.429 811.429 61.429 6.857 870 4822.2857 
1.8 805.714 805.714 55.714 14.571 870 4810.5714 
2 800 800 50 20 870 4800 
2.2 794.286 794.286 44.286 23.1432 870 4790.5714 
2.36 789.714 789.714 39.714 24.011 870 4783.8514 
2.37 789.429 789.429 39.429 24.0177 870 4783.4557 
2.4 788.571 788.571 38.571 23.9994 870 4782.2857 
2.41 788.286 788.286 38.286 23.9833 870 4781.9014 
2.6 782.857 782.857 32.857 22.5712 870 4775.1429 
2.8 777.143 777.143 27.143 18.8574 870 4769.1429 
3 771.429 771.429 21.429 12.858 870 4764.2857 
3.2 765.714 765.714 15.714 4.5708 870 4760.5714 
3.4 760 760 10 -6 870 4758 
3.6 754.286 754.286 4.286 -18.8564 870 4756.5714 
3.72 750.857 750.857 0.857 -27.669 870 4756.2629 
3.73 750.571 750.571 0.571 -28.4411 870 4756.2557 
3.74 750.286 750.286 0.286 -29.2164 870 4756.2514 
3.75 750 750 0 0 870 4756.25 
3.8 750 748.571 0 0 870 4756.25 
4 750 742.857 0 0 870 4756.25 
6 750 685.714 0 0 870 4756.25 
8 750 628.571 0 0 870 4756.25 
10 750 571.429 0 0 870 4756.25 
12 750 514.286 0 0 870 4756.25 
16 750 400 0 0 870 4756.25 
18 750 342.857 0 0 870 4756.25 
20 750 285.714 0 0 870 4756.25 
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 Figure 6.5 provides plots of the LTL carrier’s expected profits under the optimal 
response of the retailer with respect to s for the three chosen values of R. It can be observed 
from the figure that for a given value of R, within the region where the retailer does business 
with the LTL carrier (i.e., ships some positive quantity), the LTL carrier’s expected profits are 
strictly concave with respect to s. This strictly concave function as long as the retailer utilizes 
the services of the LTL carrier, has a unique maximizer. The specific value of R does not have 
an effect on the value of the unique maximizer, however, it only determines how soon the 
retailer stops using the services of the LTL carrier before the value of s is increased 
drastically. In Example 9, the value of the unique maximizer is 2.37. When R = 120, the 
retailer utilizes the LTL carrier only at small values of s. However, the resulting revenue for 
the LTL carrier at these s values does not justify his/her fixed costs. This further implies that 
the LTL carrier cannot compete with the TL carrier at R = 120. On the other hand, at R = 180 
and R = 300, the maximizing value of the LTL carrier’s expected profits, i.e., s = 2.37, is still 
a good option for the retailer in comparison to what the TL carrier charges. Therefore, the 
LTL carrier competes with the TL carrier and further maximizes his/her expected profits. It is 
important to note that, the structural characteristic of the LTL carrier’s expected profit 
function herein is specific to uniform demand distribution and may not apply to other demand 
distributions.  
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Figure 6.5 Plot of the LTL carrier’s expected profits with respect to s for varying values of R 
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6.5 Coordination of Transportation Pricing Decisions Between a TL Carrier and 
an LTL Carrier 
 
In earlier sections of this chapter, we have illustrated over numerical examples the 
savings that could be achieved by the TL carrier/LTL carrier due to transportation pricing 
decisions under the retailer’s optimal response to a given transportation price schedule of the 
LTL carrier/TL carrier. In this section, we investigate the opportunity of savings that can be 
achieved if the TL carrier and the LTL carrier coordinate their transportation pricing decisions 
knowing the best response of the retailer. Example 10 will be used to support this suggestion. 
 
In the following example setting, we will show that for the given value of s, there may 
be found a value of R which does not necessarily maximize the TL carrier’s expected profits 
under the best response of the retailer, however it increases the sum of TL carrier’s and LTL 
carrier’s expected profits. Furthermore, this value of R is such that, the savings of the LTL 
carrier on top of what his/her expected profits would be under the TL carrier’s first choice, 
exceeds the TL carrier’s loss due to choosing this value. Therefore, by an appropriate 
agreement between the TL and the LTL carrier, the LTL carrier may be better off while 
compensating the TL carrier for his/her losses. 
 
Example 10: Consider a setting with a retailer, a TL carrier and an LTL carrier with the 
following parameters: c = 19, r = 32, v = 11, b = 14, P = 150, R  = 0, s = 2, s  = 0.1, 
100,TLK =  10,LTLK =  X = Uniform (0, 1000).  
   
Under the given parameters, we have 7000270175.0)( 2 −+−= QQQG , 714.29z* =  
and 771.43.q* =  It can be shown that the optimal value of R for the TL carrier without any 
coordination with the LTL carrier is approximately 277. At this value of R, the retailer orders 
750 units with resulting expected profits as 2021.25. The TL carrier’s and the LTL carrier’s 
expected profits at R = 277 are 1285 and 0, respectively. If the TL carrier sets the value of R 
as 299 instead, the retailer’s order size is 714.29 with resulting expected profits as 2732.57. 
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The TL carrier’s and the LTL carrier’s expected profits are 1096 and 207.15, respectively.  If 
R = 299 instead of R = 277, the TL carrier’s expected profits decrease by 189, however, the 
LTL carrier’s expected profits and the retailer’s expected profits increase by 207.15 and 
711.32. Therefore, as shown in this example, there is an incentive for the retailer and the LTL 
carrier if the TL carrier increases the price he/she charges for each truck. Furthermore, the 
systemwide savings exceed the TL carrier’s expected losses. 
 
6.6 Coordination of Transportation Pricing Decisions Between a Retailer and a 
TL Carrier 
 
In this section, we investigate the opportunity of coordination that can be achieved 
between a retailer and a TL carrier. Example 11 will be used to illustrate this situation. 
 
Example 11: Consider a setting with a retailer and a TL carrier with the following 
parameters: c = 18, r = 32, v = 11, b = 14, P = 70, R  = 0, 0.3s = , 50,TLK = 10,LTLK =  X = 
Uniform (0, 1000). 
 
Under the given parameters, we have 2( ) 0.0175 28 7000G Q Q Q= − + −  and 800.q* =  
It can be shown that the TL carrier reaches the optimal profit value at R = 450, in which case 
his/her expected profits will be 4000 whereas the retailer’s expected profits will be –355.75. 
However, in this case, the retailer may choose to exit the business since he/she is having some 
loss. If the TL carrier sets R = 400, then the retailer’s and the TL carrier’s expected profits 
will be 94.25 and 3550, respectively.  A better solution may be realized when the TL carrier 
agrees to set his/her per truck cost to 203.75. In this case, without any agreement between the 
parties, the resulting expected profits will be 1987.5 for both the retailer and the TL carrier. 
However, the total expected profits amount to 3975, which is greater than those at R = 400 
(i.e., 3544.25). The retailer can use his/her savings from an R value of 203.75 to compensate 
the TL carrier’s loss. This would lead to 3550 as the TL carrier’s expected profits and 425 as 
the retailer’s expected profits.  
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Chapter 7 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This thesis analyzes the replenishment and transportation pricing problems in a setting 
consisting of a retailer and two carriers (one truck-load carrier and one less-than-truckload 
carrier).  In this setting, the retailer makes a single replenishment decision at the beginning of 
the selling period during which she/he faces random demand. The inbound replenishment 
quantity can be shipped utilizing both the TL carrier and the LTL carrier. The costs due to 
inbound transportation are incurred by the retailer. The TL carrier charges a fixed cost for 
each truck whether it is fully or partially loaded. The LTL carrier, on the other hand, charges 
in proportion to the number of units shipped. That is, a unit shipping price is charged by the 
LTL carrier. Under this transportation cost structure, the replenishment problem is defined as 
determining the retailer’s optimal order quantity given the price schedules of the carriers. The 
transportation problem for the TL carrier is defined as finding the value of the per truck 
shipping price that maximizes the TL carrier’s expected profits under the retailer’s optimal 
response for given per unit shipping price of the LTL carrier. Similarly, the transportation 
problem for the LTL carrier is defined as determining the value of the per unit shipping price 
that maximizes the LTL carrier’s expected profits under the retailer’s optimal response for a 
fixed value of TL carrier’s per truck shipping price.    
 
The expected profit function of the retailer in the corresponding replenishment 
problem is piecewise, therefore, it cannot be maximized using the classical differentiation 
techniques. Chapter 4 of the thesis provides two characterizations of the solution for the 
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retailer’s expected profit function. The results in this chapter are based on a detailed analysis 
of the structural properties of the retailer’s expected profit function. Part of the retailer’s 
expected profit function that belongs to production/inventory related profits in the single 
period stochastic replenishment problem, namely the Newsboy Problem, is strictly concave. 
This is one property that is critical to the analysis in Chapter 4 and the succeeding chapters. 
Regarding the retailer’s expected profit function excluding the transportation costs, the 
analysis in Chapter 4 utilizes the fact that this part of the function is strictly concave. 
Therefore, the analysis in Chapter 4 is generic and can be used in other problem settings 
where a supply chain entity that has strictly concave production/inventory related expected 
profits faces a transportation cost structure as in this thesis.  
 
It is important to emphasize that, in comparison to the traditional systems where 
inventory replenishment decisions are made first followed by transportation decisions, the 
replenishment problem herein considers the inventory and transportation costs jointly. In 
recent supply chain research, it has been shown that substantial savings can be achieved due 
to such integrated models. However, the Newsboy Problem with two modes of transportation 
has not been studied in the literature. 
 
Although the problem of maximizing the objective function as stated in Expression (7) 
corresponds to the replenishment problem of the retailer in this thesis, an important 
application area of the solution can be in outsourcing decisions. The trucking cost structure of 
the TL carrier is also known as the multiple set-up cost structure in the literature. It can also 
be used to model the production setup costs of a manufacturer who incurs a fixed setup cost 
for operating a capacitated machine which has the capability of processing several items at a 
time. The unit shipping price that the LTL carrier charges may be considered as the cost per 
unit if the manufacturer decides to outsource the items rather than manufacture inhouse.   As a 
result of solving the problem with the objective of maximizing Expression (7), the 
manufacturer can end up with one of the following decisions in addition to determining the 
replenishment quantity: manufacture all items inhouse, outsource all items from a third party 
or a combination of both. 
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Transportation pricing is an unexplored area in supply chain management. The 
existing research on integrated inventory and transportation decisions assume that the 
transportation price schedules are already given. This thesis shows that the TL carrier and the 
LTL carrier may increase their expected profits substantially if they carefully make their 
transportation pricing decisions. The theoretical challenges behind solving the transportation 
pricing problems as defined in this thesis are as follows: First, the carrier in the corresponding 
transportation pricing problem has to come up with the optimal response of the retailer as a 
function of both his/her and the competing carrier’s price schedule. However, due to the 
structural complexity of the retailer’s expected profit function, the solution to his/her 
replenishment problem can only be characterized by a finite number of quantities that 
dominate other solutions (of infinite size), rather than a simple analytical expression.  
Furthermore, the retailer’s expected profit function is piecewise and the decision variables in 
the transportation pricing problems not only affect the function value at a fixed quantity but 
they also affect the range of quantities where each function is defined.  A contribution of this 
thesis is to propose alternative mathematical models for transportation pricing problems of the 
TL carrier and the LTL carrier using the detailed analysis of the retailer’s optimization 
problem.  Using these alternative models, the TL carrier’s transportation pricing problem is 
solved exactly.  
 
The opportunity of savings due to making transportation pricing decisions carefully is 
illustrated over several numerical examples both for the TL carrier and the LTL carrier. 
Furthermore, it is illustrated that the carriers, by coordinating their transportation pricing 
decisions, can increase the total supply chain profits. Also, it is shown that there may be a 
coordination possibility between the retailer and the TL carrier. These observations lead to 
several future research directions involving scenarios where two of the parties cooperate 
against the third, or all of the parties coordinate their decisions. The contractual agreements 
within this context constitute some topics of interest worthy of investigation.  
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The setting investigated in this thesis is a stylistic one that concerns two competing 
carriers that are in business with the same retailer. The objectives of this thesis can also be 
extended to other settings involving different characteristics of demand, selling period, 
number of replenishment opportunities, modes of carrier, transportation price structures, etc.   
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A.1 Proof of Lemma 9 
 
 In proving the lemma, we will use the mathematical formulation in Problem P1 and 
Lemma 7.  We know from Proposition 2 that under the constraints of Problem P1, q* is 
optimal. It follows from Lemma 7 that,  q* is either realizable, or is an integer number full 
truck loads. In  both cases, the TL carrier’s objective function will be given by 
( ) ( )**,TL TLqq R R R KP⎡ ⎤∏ = − −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ . If we execute the constraints in Problem P1, it reduces to  
 
max ( )* TLq R R KP⎡ ⎤ − −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥  
 
s.t.   
                                            ( ) ( )* * ** * * ,q z zR G q G z sz sP
P P P
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥× − ≤ − + −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠              
                                            ( ) ( )* * ,qR k G q G kP
P
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤× − ≤ −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠  
** ,..., .qz
P P
k ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦                 
                                            ,sPR <   
                                            0.R ≥   
 
Note that, the objective function of the TL carrier is increasing in the value of R. Therefore, 
the largest value in the feasible region, as characterized by the constraints of the above 
formulation, should give us ( )R* q* . We have from Lemma 2 that * *.z q<  This in turn 
implies that * *q zP P
⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥>⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥ , and hence, the left side of the first constraint is positive. Since q* 
is the unique maximizer of )(QG , we further have ( ) ( )* *G q G z> . Combining this with the 
fact that ** zsz sP
P
⎢ ⎥≥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ , we conclude that the right side of the first constraint is also positive. 
Therefore, the first constraint yields the following upper bound on the solution: 
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( ) ( ) ** * *
.
* *
zG q G z sz sP PR
q z
P P
⎢ ⎥− + − ⎣ ⎦≤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥−⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥
 
 
Now, let us consider the second constraint. Since )(QG is a strictly concave function with a 
unique maximizer q* and *,kP q≤  it follows that ( ) ( )*G q G kP≥  for any integer k such that 
** qz
P P
k ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤ ≤ ≤ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ . The fact that *,kP q≤  further yields to 
*q kP
⎡ ⎤ ≥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ . If for some integer k we 
have  q*kP = , then the second constraint is trivially satisfied. Otherwise, it implies the 
following upper bound 
 
( ) ( )* .
*
G q G kP
R
q kP
−≤ ⎡ ⎤ −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
 
 
Finally, we have sPR <  as stated in the third constraint. Therefore, the largest value of R in 
the feasible region is given by 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) **** * * *min , , ,  . . 
* **
qz
P P
zG q G z sz sP G q G kPP sP k s t k
q qz kP P P
⎧ ⎫⎢ ⎥− + −⎪ ⎪−⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎡ ⎤ − ε   ∀ ≤ ≤⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪− −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎩ ⎭
  
 
 
where ε is a positive real number and q* kP ≠ for the integer values of k that are in 
consideration. 
               ■ 
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 10 
 
 In proving the lemma, we will use the mathematical formulation in Problem P2 and 
Lemma 8.  We know from Proposition 3 that under the constraints of Problem P2, z* is 
optimal. It follows from Lemma 8 that  z* is therefore realizable. The TL carrier’s objective 
function is then given by ( ) ( )**,TL TLzz R R R KP⎢ ⎥∏ = − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . If we execute the constraints in 
Problem P2, it reduces to 
  
max ( )* TLz R R KP⎢ ⎥ − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
 
s.t.   
 
                                            ( ) ( )* * ** * * ,z q zR G z G q sz sP
P P P
⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥ ⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥× − ≤ − − +⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠              
                                            ( ) ( )* ** * ,z zR k G z G kP sz sP
P P
⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥× − ≤ − − +⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠   
          ** ,..., .qz
P P
k ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦      
                                            sPR < , 
                                            0.R ≥  
 
Note that, the objective function of the TL carrier is increasing in the value of R. Therefore, 
the largest value in the feasible region, as characterized by the constraints of the above 
formulation, should give us ( )R* z* . Since * *q zP P⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥>⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥ , the left side of the first constraint is 
negative. As it has been shown in the proof of Lemma 9, the right side of the first constraint is 
also negative. Therefore, the first constraint yields the following lower bound on the solution: 
 
 79
( ) ( ) ** * *
.
* *
zG q G z sz sP PR
q z
P P
⎢ ⎥− + − ⎣ ⎦≥ ⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥−⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥
 
 
Now, let us consider the second constraint. Since )(QG is a strictly concave function with a 
unique maximizer q* and ** qz
P P
k ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤ ≤ ≤ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ , it follows that we have ( ) ( )*G z G kP≤  for any 
integer k within the specified range. Combining this with the fact that ** zsz sP
P
⎢ ⎥≥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ , we 
conclude that the right side of the second inequality is not positive. Since *z kP
⎢ ⎥ ≥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ , the left 
side of this constraint is not positive either. Note also that, if for some integer k we have 
z*,  kP = then the second constraint is trivially satisfied. Otherwise, it implies the following 
lower bound: 
 
( ) ( ) ** *
.
*
zG kP G z sz sP PR
zk P
⎢ ⎥− + − ⎣ ⎦≥ ⎢ ⎥− ⎣ ⎦
 
 
If any of the following lower bounds exceeds the upper bound given by the third constraint, 
that is sPR < , then there is no feasible R value that leads to z* as the optimal replenishment 
quantity of the retailer. Otherwise, we should choose the largest value of R in the feasible 
region, which is given by sP − ε  where ε is a positive real number.       ■ 
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A.3 Proof of Lemma 11 
 
In proving the lemma, we will use the mathematical formulation in Problem P3.  We know 
from Proposition 4 that under the constraints of Problem P3, kP is optimal. The TL carrier’s 
objective function is then given by ( ) ( ),TL TLkP R k R R K∏ = − − . If we execute the 
constraints in Problem P3, it reduces to 
 
max ( ) TLk R R K− −  
 
s.t.   
 
                                            ( ) ( )* * ,qR k G kP G q
P
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤× − ≤ −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠              
                                            ( ) ( )* ** * ,z zR k G kP G z sz sP
P P
⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥× − ≤ − + −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠   
           ( ) ( ) ( ) ,R k j G kP G jP× − ≤ −        ( ) *,...,1 .qPj k ⎢ ⎥= + ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
                      ( ) ( ) ( ) ,R k j G kP G jP× − ≤ −        ( ), ...,* 1 .zj kP⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥  
                                            sPR < , 
                                            0.R ≥  
 
 
The objective function of the TL carrier is increasing in the value of R. Therefore, the largest 
value in the feasible region, as characterized by the constraints of the above formulation, 
should give us ( )kPR* . Since k is an integer such that ** qz
P P
k ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤ ≤ ≤ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ , we have 
*q
P
k ⎢ ⎥≤ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . 
Therefore, the left side of the first constraint is not positive.  Combining *q
P
k ⎢ ⎥≤ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  with the 
fact that )(QG is a strictly concave function with a unique maximizer q*, we conclude that the 
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right side of the first constraint is also not positive. If  *qkP = , the first constraint is trivially 
satisfied. Otherwise, it implies the following lower bound: 
 
( ) ( )* .
*
G q G kP
R
q kP
−≥ ⎡ ⎤ −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
 
Now, let us consider the second constraint. Since k is an integer such that ** qz
P P
k ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤ ≤ ≤ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ , 
we have z* k P
⎢ ⎥≥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . Therefore, the left side of the second constraint is nonnegative. Since q* 
is the unique maximizer of the strictly concave function )(QG  and z* k P
⎢ ⎥≥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ , we further 
have ( ) ( )*G kP G z≤ . Combining this with the fact that ** zsz sP
P
⎢ ⎥≥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ , we conclude that the 
right side of the second constraint is also nonnegative. If * zkP = , the second constraint is 
trivially satisfied. Otherwise, it yields the following upper bound on the solution: 
 
( ) ( ) ** *
.
*
zG kP G z sz sP PR
zk P
⎢ ⎥− + − ⎣ ⎦≤ ⎢ ⎥− ⎣ ⎦
 
 
It can also be observed that the third constraint implies the following lower bound for 
( ) *,...,1 .qPj k ⎢ ⎥= + ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
 
    ( ) ( ) .G jP G kPR j k
−≥ −  
 
Finally, the fourth constraint implies the following upper bound ( ), ...,* 1 .zj kP⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥  
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( ) ( ) .G kP G jPR k j
−≤ −  
 
If any of the lower bounds exceeds the upper bounds including the one provided by the fifth 
constraint, then there is no feasible R  value that leads to kP as the maximizer of the TL 
carrier’s expected profits. Otherwise, we choose the largest value of R in the feasible region, 
which is given by 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) *
0
** *
min , lim ( ), ,  . . 1
*
z
P
zG kP G z sz sP G kP G jPP sP j s t j kk jzk P
ε→
⎧ ⎫⎢ ⎥− + − −⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦ ⎡ ⎤ − ε   ∀ ≤ ≤ −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥−⎢ ⎥−⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
. 
where ε is a positive real number.             ■ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
